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Can information be locked up? Informed trading
ahead of macro-news announcements
Abstract – U.S. government agencies routinely allow pre-release access to macroeconomic
data to accredited news agencies under embargo agreements. Using high frequency data, we
ﬁnd evidence consistent with informed trading during news embargoes of the Federal Open
Market Committee’s (FOMC) scheduled announcements. The E-mini S&P 500 futures’ av-
erage abnormal order imbalance is statistically signiﬁcant and in the direction of subsequent
policy surprises. Our estimates of pre-release informed trades’ dollar proﬁts range between
$4.5 and $210.5 million when aggregated across all markets and FOMC’s surprise announce-
ments that we examine. Notably, we ﬁnd no evidence of informed trading immediately prior
to FOMC’s news embargoes or during lockups ahead of nonfarm payroll, CPI, and GDP data
releases.
Keywords: Media Lockup; News Embargo; Informed Trading; FOMCAnnouncement; Macroe-
conomic News
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1 Introduction
Does granting selected parties early access to value-relevant information pose the risk
of giving some investors an unfair advantage? Finance academics and regulators have
long debated this issue in the corporate context. For instance, ﬁrms’ practice of provid-
ing some professionals with early access to earnings news was questioned and ultimately
banned under Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).1 Similarly, equity analysts’ prac-
tice of ‘tipping’ large clients ahead of recommendation changes led to private litigation
and internal guidelines of major brokerage ﬁrms forbidding such practice.2 We examine
similar questions that have recently emerged surrounding the release of macro-news.
Macro-news have economy-wide implications that aﬀect asset prices across several
markets.3 Attesting to the importance of macro-news, U.S. government agencies typ-
ically provide accredited news outlets with pre-release access to the information under
embargo agreements. The accredited journalists receive the data prior to the public release
(typically in press lockup facilities) to allow time for clarifying questions and preparing
reports, but cannot disclose the information until the scheduled release. However, recent
investigations raise concerns about lockup practices and highlight the potential for infor-
mation leakage that would give some traders an unfair, if not illegal advantage, akin to
trading on corporate insider information.4
1See Weber (2000a, 2000b), Shiller (2000), SEC (2000), Hasset (2000), Bushee, Matsumoto, and
Miller (2004), Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young (2008).
2See Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007), Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009), Christophe,
Ferri, and Hsieh (2010), Busse, Green, and Jegadeesh (2012), Kadan, Michaely, and Moulton (2014).
3The evidence shows that the release of macro-news aﬀects prices in equity markets (e.g., Pearce
and Roley (1985), French and Roll (1986), Ederington and Lee (1993), Veronesi (1999), Flannery and
Protopapadakis (2001), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Vega (2006), Andersen et al. (2007), Tetlock
(2010)), bond markets (e.g., Pearce and Roley (1985), French and Roll (1986), Ederington and Lee
(1993), Veronesi (1999), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2001), Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a),
Vega (2006), Tetlock (2010)), and foreign exchange markets (e.g., Urich and Wachtel (1984), Fleming
and Remolona (1999), Balduzzi et al. (2001), Andersen et al. (2003), Pasquariello and Vega (2007)).
Recent work by Savor and Wilson (2013, 2014) and Lucca and Moench (2014) documents systematic
unconditional return patterns in equity markets during the days around macro-news announcements.
4These concerns led to the tightening of lockup security requirements and recently prompted the
Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Labor to recommend discontinuing the use of press lockups.
Among others, see also The Wall Street Journal reports “A Probe on Data Releases Is Revived” in April
2013; “FBI Finds Black Boxes That Control Government Data Are Vulnerable” and “Deutsche Borse’s
News Service for Traders Draws Scrutiny of Investigators” in August 2013; “Labor Department Panel
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In this paper, we examine for the ﬁrst time the potential informed trading during
macro-news embargo periods. Given the importance of macro-news and the widespread
use of news embargoes, understanding the consequences of these practices is important to
ensure market integrity. In particular, we use high frequency data to investigate whether
there is informed trading during lockup periods ahead of macro-news releases previously
shown to have the largest impact on market prices. These include the announcements
of the Federal funds target rate by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), as
well as the releases of data on nonfarm payroll and consumer price index (CPI) by the
Department of Labor (DOL), and on the gross domestic product (GDP) growth by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) between September 1997 and June 2013.
Consistent with some traders exhibiting an informational advantage, we ﬁnd robust
evidence of informed trading activities across several markets during lockup periods ahead
of monetary policy announcements by FOMC. In particular, we document signiﬁcant ab-
normal order imbalances that are in the direction of the subsequent policy surprises. The
economic magnitude of our results is signiﬁcant. Back-of-the-envelope calculations sug-
gest that the aggregate dollar proﬁts of lockup-related informed trades ahead of FOMC’s
surprise announcements range between $4.5 and $210.5 million across all the markets
that we examine.
Notably, we ﬁnd no evidence of informed trading prior to the start of FOMC’s lockup
periods. Moreover, we ﬁnd no evidence of informed trading ahead of announcements by
other government agencies, although their post-release informational value is compara-
ble to the FOMC’s announcements. This evidence jointly suggests the existence of a
systematic link between informed trading activities and the FOMC’s embargo practices.
Our tests rest on the tenet that, to capitalize on pre-release access to macro-news, an
investor would want to trade an instrument that has high systematic, but low idiosyn-
cratic risk exposure. Moreover, the instrument needs to be available for trading prior
Calls for Ending Lockup for Jobs Data” in January 2014; and CNBC report “News organizations respond
to Fed lockup questions” in September 2013. Most recently, potential leakages from the Federal Reserve
were at the center of investigations suggesting Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Medley Global Advisors
received conﬁdential information ahead of its public release, see for example Bloomberg News report
“Fed Leak Tipped Traders to Historic Stimulus Move, Prompted Secret Inquiry” in December 2014.
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to the macro-news release time and have suﬃcient liquidity to minimize trading costs
and price impact. The E-mini S&P 500 futures (ES) meets these criteria across all the
announcements that we study. Hence, we use it as our main testing security. In supple-
mental tests, we also examine the E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF,
the PowerShares QQQ ETF tracking the Nasdaq 100 index, the US treasury futures, and
the gold futures.5
In a semi-strong eﬃcientmarket (Fama (1970)), an investor can proﬁt on pre-disclosure
private information, if the private signal implies a valuation diﬀerent from market expec-
tations. The greater this diﬀerence, the more likely it is that the investor would trade
and proﬁt. Therefore, it is critical for our purposes to measure pre-release market expec-
tations in order to identify the information content of macro-news announcements. For
the Federal funds target rate, we measure market expectations using the implied interest
rate from Federal funds futures traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) simi-
lar to Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). For nonfarm payroll, CPI, and
GDP announcements, there are no traded instruments from which to infer market ex-
pectations. Thus, we rely instead on economists’ forecasts from the Blue Chip Economic
Indicators Survey to classify an announcement as a surprise.
In our tests, we follow existing studies of equity analysts’ tipping (e.g., Irvine, Lipson,
and Puckett (2007), Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010)) to identify informed trading
activity. Namely, we examine the order imbalances of the testing security prior to the
macro-news’ releases, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between buyer- and seller-initiated trad-
ing volumes divided by total trading volume. We measure volume either by number of
trades or by dollar amount traded, yielding two metrics of order imbalance. To mea-
sure abnormal trading activities on announcement days, we use as a benchmark all
non-announcement days in the prior 21 trading days or since the last announcement,
whichever is fewer. Then, for each type of macro-news release, we compare abnormal or-
der imbalances around surprise and non-surprise announcements. Our empirical strategy
ultimately exploits the systematic variation across announcement vs. non-announcement
5We only use these securities in our supplemental tests because the other futures contracts are sig-
niﬁcantly less liquid than the ES and the ETFs are only available during stock market trading hours -
i.e., prior to FOMC announcements.
3
days as well as across surprise vs. non-surprise announcements.
Our tests yield several important results. First, across various markets that we exam-
ine, we ﬁnd evidence of informed trading activity prior to FOMC’s surprise announce-
ments and this activity is exclusively concentrated in the window immediately before
the scheduled release - i.e., lockup period. In the case of E-mini S&P 500 futures, for
instance, the abnormal order imbalances are 8.4%-9.4% higher for FOMC’s surprise an-
nouncements compared to non-surprise ones. Similar patterns emerge when we examine
the E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF, or the PowerShares QQQ Nas-
daq 100 ETF. In contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence of informed trading in the thirty minutes
prior to the start of FOMC lockups, nor do we ﬁnd diﬀerences in trading activity during
FOMC lockups ahead of non-surprise announcements versus non-announcement days.
In contrast to FOMC’s announcements, we ﬁnd no evidence of informed trading ahead
of DOL or BEA announcements. This is particularly relevant, given that government
investigations focused on the permeability of the DOL’s lockup facilities since at least
2011. At that point, Need to Know News (NTKN), a news media organization founded
in 2004 and granted press credentials in 2006, was alleged of leaking information and
ultimately banned from DOL’s lockups.6 In supplemental tests we examine whether our
results vary around 2006, but ﬁnd that our inferences are robust across subperiods.
In light of our baseline results, we focus on FOMC’s announcements in our subsequent
analysis. First, we zoom in on the lockup window and divide this period into three ten-
minute windows. The evidence indicates that the informed order imbalances in E-mini
S&P 500 futures are mostly concentrated in the last twenty minutes prior to the scheduled
release, particularly the [-20, -10] window. Second, we examine the robustness of our
results to controlling for discrepancies between scheduled and actual release times of the
FMOC policy announcements (e.g., Flemming and Piazzesi (2005), Lucca and Moench
(2014)). In particular, using the earliest time of press reports available on Factiva, we
continue to ﬁnd robust evidence of informed trading activity in the window [-20,-10].7
6See “Deutsche Borse’s News Service for Traders Draws Scrutiny of Investigators”, The Wall Street
Journal, August 12, 2013, by Brody Mullins and Scott Patterson.
7This holds whether we deﬁne “0” as the actual release time or the earliest of the actual and scheduled
release times.
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Third, we show that our inferences are robust to using stricter deﬁnitions of target rate
policy surprises or the actual magnitude of the unexpected target rate policy. Similarly,
accounting for the Federal Reserve’s announcements of Quantitative Easing measures
since November 2008 does not aﬀect our main inferences. Fourth, we repeat our baseline
tests conditional on the direction of the policy surprise and ﬁnd evidence of asymmetric
eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, informed trading occurs mainly before good news - i.e., unexpected
rate cuts. Short-sale constraints in the stock market may account for this asymmetry,
because they limit the ability of liquidity providers in the futures market to hedge their
positions. It is also possible that informed traders use limit orders more heavily ahead
of bad news surprises (e.g., Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2014)), which would
prevent us from correctly identifying informed trades in this case. Lastly, when we
examine other markets, we ﬁnd evidence of informed trading activity in E-mini Nasdaq
100 futures, S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100 ETFs, and 2-Year Treasury futures.
To conclude our analysis, we examine the price impact of pre-release trading activities
and the corresponding potential proﬁts that privately informed traders may have enjoyed.
Speciﬁcally, similar to the analysis of Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett, (2007), we examine
the relation between pre-release order imbalances and returns over various windows.
Although surprise announcements are not associated with statistically signiﬁcant pre-
release cumulative abnormal returns using actual announcement times, we do in fact
ﬁnd that pre-release order imbalances are signiﬁcantly correlated with contemporaneous
returns, consistent with informed trading. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that
informed trades executed during the FOMC lockups earn substantial proﬁts. Assuming
informed trades are liquidated ﬁve, ten, or thirty minutes after the announcement, the
informed traders’ aggregate dollar proﬁts across all surprise announcements and markets
that we examine range between $4.5 and $210.5 million.8
Our analysis contributes to the ongoing policy debate about lockup practices by
testing whether macro-news lockups are associated with informed trading. While our ev-
idence is consistent with information leakage during FOMC’s lockup periods, admittedly
8The lower bound assumes only the order imbalance fraction of the trading volume is informed,
whereas the upper bound assumes informed traders take the right position in each recorded transaction.
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we are unable to identify the exact information channel due to data limitations. The sys-
tematic link between the timing of FOMC’s embargoes and informed trading activities is
consistent with information leaking directly from the news media with pre-release access
or from other FOMC insiders with incentives to mimic such behavior. Alternatively, it
is also possible that traders with a superior ability to predict FOMC policy surprises
trade during lockups. The latter explanation, however, seems at odds with the lack of in-
formed trading immediately prior to the start of FOMC’s lockups when market liquidity
is higher, or during lockup windows of other agencies that release valuable information.
Our study makes a unique contribution to the literature on the capital market con-
sequences of macro-news announcements (see footnote 3). Existing studies show that
macroeconomic news aﬀect post-announcement market prices. We add to this litera-
ture by showing that traders in equity index futures and ETF markets begin trading
in the direction of FOMC’s policy surprises during pre-announcement embargoes. Our
analysis also complements the recent evidence in Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2014), which suggests that information about FOMC policy may in fact reach market
participants well ahead of when the oﬃcial decisions are set.
Our analysis also complements other recent studies of scheduled macroeconomic an-
nouncements (e.g., Savor and Wilson (2013, 2014); Lucca and Moench (2014)). In partic-
ular, Lucca and Moench examine the behavior of equity market prices ahead of FOMC’s
scheduled releases. They document an unconditional run-up of 49 basis points in the S&P
500 index during the 24 hours leading to FOMC’s announcements and conclude that this
pattern is not driven by informed trading. Diﬀerent from their study, we examine the
pre-release eﬀect of FOMC’s policy announcements conditional on their information con-
tent and focus on the relatively short lockup period - i.e., 30 minutes, when information
leakage is most likely. Our evidence indicates that there is in fact systematic informed
trading ahead of FOMC’s scheduled announcements.
More broadly, our study contributes to the literature regarding the eﬀects of short-
lived private information on trading activity and price formation. Consistent with the
premise of existing theories (e.g., Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) and
Brunnermeier (2005)), there is mounting evidence that short-lived informational advan-
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tages arise in a variety of contexts. For example, some investors appear to enjoy early
“tipping” on analyst recommendations (e.g., Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett, (2007); Gold-
stein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009); Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010); Busse,
Green, and Jegadeesh (2012); Kadan, Michaely, and Moulton (2014)). Other (high-speed)
traders beneﬁt from early access to news feeds (e.g., von Beschwitz, Keim, and Massa
(2013); Hu, Pan, and Wang (2013)) and SEC ﬁlings (Rogers, Skinner, and Zechman
(2014)). News about sovereign credit ratings appear to reach some market participants
well ahead of public announcements (Michaelides, Milidonis, Nishiotis, and Papakyriacou
(2014)), and similar evidence is available for policy news regarding regulated industries
(Reeb, Zhang, and Zhao (2014)). Adding to this growing body of research, we ﬁnd ev-
idence of a short-lived information advantage during news embargoes ahead of salient
policy announcements of the FOMC.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional
background and develops our main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and variable
construction. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis and Section 5
concludes.
2 Institutional background and testable hypothesis
Across all information events, the release of macro-news is among those with the
largest and widest potential impact on capital markets. Attesting to its importance,
government agencies manage tightly the macro-news disclosure process. The agencies
have an interest in the timely, wide, and accurate dissemination of macro-data that
would enhance the public’s understanding of the information released. To foster this
policy goal, it is standard practice to grant accredited news media with pre-release access
to macroeconomic data, allowing time for questions and preparation of accurate reports
ahead of the oﬃcial releases. Counter-balancing these beneﬁts is the risk of granting some
market participants an unfair (if not illegal) advantage, if such early access is exploited
to trade. To ensure a level playing ﬁeld, government agencies have protocols that impose
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news embargoes (or lockups), whereby those who are granted early access to the data
would refrain from disseminating the information ahead of the scheduled releases.9
In recent years, macro-news embargoes and more generally the security of government
data storage facilities have come under scrutiny after internal investigations found severe
vulnerabilities.10 As a result of these investigations, the DOL devised a new set of secu-
rity procedures and for the ﬁrst time revoked media credentials for some news agencies
suspected of embargo violations (e.g., Need to Know News). Most recently, news reports
have indicated that important information about policy decisions of the Federal Reserve
may have been leaked. The Fed’s internal investigations seem to suggest that important
conﬁdential information reached ﬁnancial institutions and capital market analysts ahead
of the public release during the ﬁnancial crisis.11
The recent events suggest that leakages of macro-news are possible during lockup
periods.12 We aim to assess the implications of this concern by examining whether
macro-news lockups are associated with systematically informed trading activities, as
measured by order ﬂows, and whether this trading aﬀects the price formation process.
In particular, agents with pre-release access to the information would want to trade to
capitalize on it. Hence, prior to scheduled macro-news releases, trading activities on
securities predominantly exposed to macro factors should reveal the likely presence of
informed traders.
Given the previous discussion, we examine whether securities predominantly exposed
to macro factors experience abnormal order imbalances in the direction of the subsequent
macro-news during media lockup periods.
9See DOL website - http://www.dol.gov/dol/media/lockupnotice.htm: “April 10, 2012 Policy State-
ment and News Organization Agreement”, “Press Lock-Up Summary”, “Testimony of Carl Fillichio,
Senior Advisor for Communications and Public Aﬀairs before the Committee on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform, United States House of Representatives, June 6, 2012.”
10See DOL website - http://www.dol.gov/dol/media/lockupnotice.htm: “CleanSweep Red Team Re-
port” and “CleanSweep Mitigation Measures Acceptance Testing.”
11See Bloomberg News report “Fed Leak Tipped Traders to Historic Stimulus Move, Prompted Secret
Inquiry” in December 2014.
12Oﬃcial procedures of the DOL and BEA clearly indicate that the lockup period is thirty-minute,
whereas we could not ﬁnd any oﬃcial document regarding the length of FOMC lockups. In our tests, we
use a 30-minute window for all announcement events and then further zoom in on subwindows within
the thirty minutes prior to FOMC announcements.
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3 Data and variable construction
In this section, we describe the data sources, sample selection, and variable construction.
3.1 Testing securities
We use the E-mini S&P 500 futures (ES) as our main testing security for several reasons.
First, the asset underlying ES contracts is the S&P 500 index. Because the underlying
asset is a diversiﬁed portfolio of large stocks, traders with positions in ES contracts are
exposed mostly, if not exclusively, to market-wide risk. Investors with advanced infor-
mation about economy-wide news would have strong incentives to trade such products
to minimize their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Second, the ES is available for trad-
ing almost 24 hours on the Globex electronic platform of the CME.13 This allows us to
examine the trading activities associated with macro-news releases by DOL and BEA,
which take place at 8:30 a.m. EST before the U.S. stock market opens. Third, informed
traders have strong incentives to trade in deep and liquid markets, so as to minimize
their trading costs and price impact. Compared to other index products such as the S&P
500 futures and the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY), the ES is substantially more liquid.
According to the CME, the ES market has an average daily volume of over 2.1 million
contracts and notional value of $170 billion in the second quarter of 2013.14 Moreover,
compared to securities such as stocks and ETFs, the ES allows traders to take on higher
leverage and pay lower commissions. The initial and maintenance margins of the ES
required by the CME are 6.6% and 6% respectively as of December 2014.15 Therefore,
we expect that informed trading prior to macro-news announcements, if any, would be
more predominant in the ES compared to other instruments.16
13Trading on the CME Globex electronic platform for the E-mini contracts halts between 5:15 p.m.-
6:00 p.m. EST every day and between 4:15 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. EST every day except for Sunday.
14See CME Group Leading Products: Q2 2013 publication, available at http://www.cmegroup.com
/education /ﬁles/cme-group-leading-products-2013-q2.pdf.
15See CME website at http : //www.cmegroup.com/trading/equity − index/us− index/e−mini−
sandp500performancebonds.html.
16Although we predict that absolute activity of informed traders would be higher in the ES, it is not
obvious that their relative activity in the same market also would be higher in the presence of liquidity-
based trading. In fact, informed traders may have more opportunities to hide behind liquidity orders,
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In addition to the ES, we also examine other futures products: the E-mini Nasdaq 100
futures (NQ), the 2-Year and 10-Year US Treasury futures, and the gold futures. Further-
more, since FOMC’s releases take place during trading hours, for these announcements
we also examine the two most liquid equity index ETFs: the SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY)
and the PowerShares QQQ ETF (QQQ, tracking Nasdaq 100 index).17
The CME introduced the ES contracts on September 9, 1997. In our tests, we use the
full history of the ES’ time-stamped (to the second) transaction-level data up to June
30, 2013. The NQ contracts started trading on June 21, 1999, and again we obtain the
full history of transaction-level data up to June 30, 2013. The US Treasury futures data
begin on January 2, 2004 and the gold futures data go back to December 1, 1999.18 In
our tests, we focus on the front-end futures contracts, because they are typically the most
liquid contracts. We obtain transaction-level data on the ETFs (SPY and QQQ) from
the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. SPY’s transaction-level data are available
for the entire sample period, whereas QQQ began trading only on March 10, 1999. Like
the futures data, our ETF TAQ data also end on June 30, 2013.
3.2 Surprise in macroeconomic announcements
In this paper, we investigate the scheduled announcements by three agencies that adopt
lockup practices ahead of those releases: the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We
focus on the announcements of four types of macro-news: the Federal funds target rate
(FOMC), the nonfarm payroll (DOL), the CPI (DOL), and the GDP (BEA). For each
announcement type in the period between September 9, 1997 and June 30, 2013, we
collect the announcement date and time, as well as the actual announcement. Table 1
provides further institutional details about these events.
making it harder for econometricians to detect abnormal activities.
17It is possible that informed traders are also active in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. However,
given the lack of data for these markets, we have to limit our analysis to exchange-traded products.
18We obtain transaction data from the CME Globex only while the pit trading on these products
started earlier. We choose to examine the electronic trading data because of liquidity reasons.
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[Table 1 about here]
To gauge the information content of macro-news announcements, it is critical to mea-
sure market expectations prior to the scheduled releases. The diﬀerence between market
expectations and announced values represents the news that market prices should im-
pound upon announcement. We adopt two diﬀerent approaches to infer market expecta-
tions, depending on the macro-news type. For the Federal funds rate announcements by
the FOMC, we rely on the Federal funds futures traded at the CME, in the spirit of Kut-
tner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). On each trading day, there are multiple
Federal funds futures contracts with diﬀerent maturity dates. We ﬁrst calculate the im-
plied interest rate for the rest of the life of each contract at the end of each trading day.19
Then, to estimate the expected Federal funds target rate, we use the mean implied spot
rate across all available contracts, weighting each contract by its daily trading volume.
The diﬀerence between the expected Federal funds rate on the day before the FOMC
announcement and the announced target rate is our measure of the surprise. There are
126 FOMC announcements in our sample.20
In our main analysis we depart from the method developed in Kuttner (2001) because
the latter deﬁnes FOMC’s policy surprises based on post-announcement information
(i.e., Federal funds futures prices) not available during the lockup window. Instead, our
method provides an ex ante measure of policy surprises based on information actually
available to parties with lockup access. As discussed below, the evidence in Figure 2 (and
Table A2 of the Internet Appendix) shows that announcement returns are signiﬁcantly
correlated with our surprise measures. Therefore, our measure contains information that
is valuable (and possible) for a trader to possess during FOMC’s lockups. In subsequent
tests, we explore the eﬀect of using alternative surprise deﬁnitions including Kuttner’s
19The 30 day Federal funds futures are settled against the average daily Fed funds overnight rate
for the delivery month. For futures in the current month, the implied rate at the end of day k is
1/(n− k)(n ∗Rk −
∑k
i=1 ri), where n is the number of days in the month, Rk is the quoted rate on the
future contract, and ri is the realized Fed overnight rate. For contracts in the following months, the
implied rate is the same as the quoted future rate.
20There were in fact 127 announcements during our sample period, but we drop April 29, 2009, because
trading on the Federal funds futures market drained after April 17. Table A1 in the appendix tabulates
the detailed information about the implied and actual Federal fund rate.
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(2001) method.
For the macro-data announcements by the DOL and BEA, there are no traded instru-
ments from which we can directly infer market expectations. Thus, we rely instead on
the distribution of economists’ forecasts in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators Survey to
infer market expectations (i.e., median economist forecast). During our sample period,
there are 189 scheduled releases for each announcement type of the DOL and BEA.
For each announcement type, Table 2 provides summary statistics of the expected and
actual values, their diﬀerence, and the absolute value of the diﬀerence.21 Panel A shows
that the average futures-implied Federal funds rate is 2.734%, while the average target
rate announced by the FOMC is 2.679%. The average and median diﬀerence between the
two rates is arguably small, at less than 4 basis points (bp). The average (median) abso-
lute diﬀerence is somewhat larger, 8.3 (5.9) bp. There is, however, substantial variation
across announcements and, in the extremes, the FOMC’s policy surprise is as large as
45.5 bp. Panels B, C, and D report similar statistics for nonfarm payroll, CPI, and GDP
announcements. There is large variation in the announcement surprises in each panel.
Comparing actual announcement and the absolute diﬀerence in each panel, we ﬁnd that
the ‘relative’ announcement surprise is much smaller for the FOMC events compared to
the other events. This may be due to the fact that we use a continuously updated mea-
sure of expectations based on market prices of Federal funds futures for FOMC events,
whereas we must rely on a relatively stale measure of expectation based on economists’
surveys for the other events.
[Table 2 about here]
The magnitude of the surprise matters to traders because it directly aﬀects the po-
tential value of access to private information about the corresponding announcement.
Indeed, small surprises should not induce much informed trading, because the antici-
pated price update may be too small to oﬀset the trader’s transaction costs. Therefore,
to conduct meaningful tests, we need to identify those surprises that would in fact provide
21Since October 19, 2008, the FOMC has announced ranges for the target rate, rather than a single
ﬁgure. In these cases, we use the mid-point of the range to calculate the reported statistics.
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a privately informed investor with a proﬁtable trading opportunity. To this end, for each
announcement type, we construct an indicator variable, SUR, that equals one when the
surprise exceeds certain thresholds and zero otherwise. For the FOMC announcements,
in our baseline tests, we set the thresholds at ±12.5 bp because the minimum adjustment
in the Federal funds target rate is 25 bp. Hence, SURFOMC is equal to one whenever the
FOMC announcement surprise is outside the ±12.5 bp range.22
It is important to note that, since the inception of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the Fed-
eral Reserve adopted additional policy measures and the corresponding announcements
soon became more salient than the traditional Federal funds target rate announcements.
In November 2008, the Federal Reserve began its Quantitative Easing (QE) programs,
i.e., large-scale open-market purchases of assets such as treasuries and mortgage-backed
securities, to reduce borrowing rates. Together with the scheduled announcement of the
Federal funds target rate, the corresponding press releases routinely provided information
about the Federal Reserve’s stance regarding its QE programs.
In our robustness tests, as in prior studies (e.g., Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Hamilton and Wu (2012)), we identify the information
content of QE-related announcements by the resulting daily change in the realized rate
of the ten-year treasury on the FOMC announcement day. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst calculate
the standard deviation of the daily change in the realized rate during the ten trading days
prior and the ten trading days following each announcement. Then, if the magnitude of
the realized rate change on the announcement day exceeds 1.75 times the rolling-window
estimate of its standard deviation, we classify it as a surprise.23
For the macro-news announcements by DOL and BEA, it is less obvious how to deﬁne
large surprise announcements. It seems reasonable that the surprise in an announcement
22The FOMC adopted a new policy of setting a range for the target rate since October 19, 2008. For the
corresponding 38 FOMC announcements, we use the following method to identify signiﬁcant surprises:
if the future-implied rate is above the upper bound or below the lower bound of the announced target
rate range by at least 12.5 bp, SURFOMC is equal to one, and zero otherwise. Our results are robust,
if we use instead the diﬀerence between the futures-implied rate and the the target range midpoint to
deﬁne surprises.
23Our results do not change materially, if we use ﬁve- or three-year treasuries, or if impose more
stringent requirements on the magnitude of the standardized daily change in treasury rates on the
announcement day, e.g., greater than 2 standard deviations.
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would be more salient to investors when the announced values fall in the tails of the
economist forecasts’ distribution. Thus, in this study, we set SURDOL/BEA equal to one
when the announced value is outside the 10th and 90th percentiles of economists’ forecasts
and zero otherwise. For robustness, we also experiment with alternative deﬁnitions of
surprises. For instance, we use the minimum and maximum forecasts as the thresholds
or standardize the announcement surprise by the rolling-window standard deviation of
the same macro variable and require it to be beyond some threshold, e.g., 1.75 or 2. Our
inferences do not vary across the diﬀerent methods.
Our baseline tests do not diﬀerentiate between good and bad news surprises. However,
unexpected increases in the Federal funds rate or the CPI and unexpected decreases in
the nonfarm payrolls or GDP convey an immediate negative signal to capital market
participants (e.g., Andersen et al. (2003), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). In these
instances, we reverse the signs of the order imbalances and returns of the testing securities
so that all surprise announcements should be associated with positive abnormal order
imbalances and returns in the presence of informed trading. Then, in our last set of tests,
we separate good and bad news surprises to assess whether they have an asymmetric
impact on trading activity and returns around macro-news announcements.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 shows the annual breakdown of the number of events based on the surprise
announcement indicator, SUR. Out of 126 FOMC events, 25 are classiﬁed as surprise
announcements that are mostly concentrated in the ﬁrst half of the sample period. For the
other announcement types, there are no obvious time-series patterns in the distribution
of surprises. Overall, surprise announcements account for one quarter to one third of the
total sample of 189 announcements by the DOL or BEA.
Before proceeding with our main tests centered on trading activity, we examine the
return patterns of our main testing security (E-mini S&P 500 futures) around macro-news
announcements. We begin by plotting the average minute by minute cumulative returns
from 9:30 a.m. on the day before the announcement to 4 p.m. on the announcement day,
in Panels A-D of Figure 1. To facilitate comparisons, the cumulative returns for diﬀerent
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announcement types are plotted against the same scale in the four panels. Consistent
with Lucca and Moench (2014), there is a clear (unconditional) return run-up before
FOMC announcements and this pattern arises long before the start of FOMC’s lockup
periods. In contrast, we ﬁnd no clear evidence of price run-ups before the announcements
by the DOL and BEA, consistent with Savor and Wilson (2013, 2014).
[Figure 1 about here]
In Panels A-D of Figure 2, we zoom in on the two-hour window around the four types
of macro-news announcements to assess whether our surprise measures are economi-
cally sensible. In each panel, we plot the cumulative returns starting one hour before
non-surprise announcements (SUR=0) using a dashed line and before surprise announce-
ments (SUR=1) using a solid line. Across all event types, surprise announcements are
associated with a larger price impact than non-surprise announcements, consistent with
surprises conveying new information to market participants. However, the timing of the
returns around the oﬃcial releases are notably diﬀerent across event types. On the one
hand, Panel A of Figure 2 shows that, during the thirty minutes preceding the FOMC
lockup period, there is no diﬀerence between price patterns associated with surprise and
non-surprise announcements. However, the two return-paths begin to diverge notably
during the lockup period and continue to do so following the oﬃcial release time. More-
over, FOMC surprise announcements are associated with greater post-announcement
return volatility. On the other hand, Panels B-D of Figure 2 show that there is little,
if any diﬀerence between cumulative returns associated with non-surprise and surprise
announcements prior to the oﬃcial release of nonfarm payroll, CPI, and GDP data by the
DOL and BEA. Moreover, although BEA and DOL surprise announcements are associ-
ated with relatively large price jumps following the oﬃcial releases, there are no notable
diﬀerences in the post-announcement return volatility between non-surprise and surprise
announcements after the initial jump.
[Figure 2 about here]
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3.3 Measurement of informed trading
Informed trading is not directly observable. Assuming informed traders use market orders
to exploit their information advantage, we examine the order imbalance in the testing
security deﬁned as (B-S)/(B+S), where B (S) is the aggregate buyer-initiated (seller-
initiated) trading volume. We use two separate measures of order imbalance, OIN and
OID, where volume is deﬁned as number of trades and dollar trading volume, respec-
tively.
The transaction-level data from the CME do not ﬂag the direction of the transaction
nor do they contain matched quotes. Therefore, we rely on the tick rule to assign trade
direction. Namely, a transaction is classiﬁed as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated), if the
transaction price is above (below) the last diﬀerent transaction price. We exclude out-
of-sequence trades from the analysis. Because there can be multiple transactions in one
second and the data are only stamped to the second, we ﬁrst calculate volume-weighted
price for each second and then apply the tick rule to the bulk of transactions occurring
in the same second.24 We also calculate futures returns using the volume-weighted prices
to reduce measurement error. For the two ETF securities, we obtain the quote data in
addition to the transaction data from the TAQ database and adopt Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm to determine the trade direction. Namely, we compare the transaction price
to the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes and, if the transaction price is above (below)
the midpoint quote, it is classiﬁed as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). In instances where
the transaction price is equal to the midpoint, we instead use the tick rule to identify the
direction of the trade.
In our baseline analysis, we examine three event windows: the pre-lockup period from
one hour before to half an hour before a macro-news scheduled announcement, [-60,-30];
the lockup period from half hour before to the scheduled announcement, [-30,0]; and
the post-lockup one-hour period following the scheduled release, [0,60]. For each event
window, we compute the corresponding order imbalance as the diﬀerence between the
24In a recent study, Panayides, Shohﬁ, and Smith (2014) ﬁnd that the bulk tick test outperforms the
traditional Lee and Ready algorithm and other trade signing algorithms when the market is dominated
by high frequency trading.
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total buyer- and seller-initiated volumes scaled by total trading volume. Table 4 reports
the mean, standard deviation, and median for each measure of informed trading in each
event window. Since we later examine the price impact, we also include the cumulative
returns in each event window. The table includes summary statistics for the benchmark
measures, which we estimate using the same trading hour windows during the 21 trading
days prior to the current announcement or since the last announcement, whichever is
fewer. Each panel in Table 4 shows summary statistics for the variables of interest during
the control days (ANN=0), the non-surprise announcements (SUR=0), and the surprise
ones (SUR=1). Overall, there are large diﬀerences between these groups, especially
during the [-30,0] lockup period. In the next section, we formally test for diﬀerences in
the order imbalance measures across the three sets of trading days.
[Table 4 about here]
4 Results
4.1 Trading activity around macro-news announcements
In this section we present the evidence pertaining to our main hypothesis. We begin
by examining visually the typical trading activity taking place around macro-news an-
nouncements. Similar to Figure 2, in Figures 3 and 4, we plot the minute-by-minute order
imbalance based on number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID), respectively, for
the two-hour period around the four announcement types. Across the board, the order
imbalance evidence in the two ﬁgures is consistent with the return patterns documented
in Figure 2.
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
In Figures 3 and 4, Panel A shows that for FOMC events the order imbalance is small
and largely random before lockups for both surprise and non-surprise announcements.
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During pre-release lockups, however, most minutes’ order imbalances tend to be in the
direction of the subsequent announcement surprise (above the zero line) and larger in
magnitude. In contrast, during the same period, the order imbalances of non-surprise
announcements continue to be scattered and small. Following both surprise and non-
surprise announcements, the order imbalances become smaller also as a result of higher
aggregate trading volumes consistent with lower information asymmetry and uncertainty.
Panels B-D of the same ﬁgures focus on DOL and BEA releases. Consistent with the
return plots, there are no obvious patterns in the pre-release order imbalances associated
with surprise or non-surprise announcements.
Overall, Figures 3-4 reveal notable diﬀerences in trading activity across surprise and
non-surprise announcements during lockup periods ahead of FOMC announcements. To
assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these diﬀerences, we regress the two order imbalance
measures, OIN and OID, for each event window (i.e., [-60,-30], [-30,0], and [0,60]) on the
announcement and surprise indicators. Table 5 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS)
coeﬃcient estimates from these models.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the regression results for FOMC announcements. Columns
1 and 2 focus on the pre-lockup window (i.e., [-60,-30]). The evidence shows that nei-
ther ANN nor SUR are associated with signiﬁcant market activity in the ES before
FOMC lockups. To gauge the diﬀerences between surprise announcements and non-
announcement days, we report the results of Wald tests in the last two rows of each
column - the ﬁrst row reports the sum of ANN and SUR coeﬃcients and the second row
reports the corresponding p-value. The results of these tests are not statistically signif-
icant at conventional levels, suggesting that there is no diﬀerence in market activities
between surprise announcement days and non-announcement ones.
[Table 5 about here]
Columns 3 and 4 report results for the lockup period, i.e., window [-30,0]. The ANN
dummy coeﬃcient estimate is not signiﬁcant in either column, indicating that FOMC
non-surprise announcements are not associated with abnormal trading activities during
the lockup. However, the SUR dummy coeﬃcient estimate is signiﬁcant in both models,
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indicating that there are signiﬁcantly more market orders executed in the direction of
the subsequent surprise than those in the opposite direction. In particular, the SUR
coeﬃcient estimates in Columns 3 (OIN model) and 4 (OID model) are equal to 8.43
and 9.37, with t-statistics of 3.76 and 3.25, respectively. Hence, the number and dollar
volume of market orders executed in the direction of the subsequent surprise exceed those
in the wrong direction by 8.43% and 9.37% of the total volume, respectively. Given that
the typical order imbalance is less than one percent in this highly liquid market, these
magnitudes are economically large.
It is also noteworthy that the apparent diﬀerences in trading activity between the
pre-lockup, i.e., [-60,-30], and lockup, i.e., [-30,0], windows are large and statistically
signiﬁcant, as shown formally in Table A3 of the Internet Appendix. This evidence
suggests that informed traders start trading more aggressively only after the information
contained in the FOMC’s policy announcement is supplied to accredited news agencies,
prior to its release.
Columns 5 and 6 of Panel A focus on market activities in the one hour following the of-
ﬁcial FOMC releases. We ﬁnd that the post-release abnormal order imbalances associated
with FOMC surprise announcements are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those associated
with non-surprise announcements. Overall, the evidence is consistent with information
leakage during media lockup periods, whereby informed investors take advantage of the
information in FOMC announcements by trading actively in the ES market.
Panels B, C, and D report the results of the analysis for the release of nonfarm payroll,
CPI, and GDP data by the DOL and BEA. Consistent with the patterns in Figures 2-4,
we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of informed trading in the ES market during
lockup periods ahead of those announcements.
4.2 Subperiod analysis
In this subsection, we investigate whether there is a structural break in our baseline
results around 2006. This is when a news agency accused of leaking information, Need
to Know News, was granted access to the lockup rooms. In particular, we augment our
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baseline regression models by adding a dummy variable, POST, which takes a value of
one for observations in or after 2006 and zero otherwise. We also interact POST with
the ANN and SUR dummies to gauge the change in the eﬀect of surprise announcements
on trading activities during lockups. Table 6 reports the OLS estimation results.
[Table 6 about here]
In summary, the coeﬃcient estimates of the SUR indicator remain largely unchanged
and the interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. These
results are not consistent with the notion that Need to Know News exacerbated infor-
mation leakage before FOMC announcements or facilitated informed trading before the
BEA or DOL announcements. The (lack of) evidence for the latter announcement types,
however, should be interpreted with caution. It is possible that a systematic lack of liq-
uidity in the index futures markets may limit the informed traders’ ability to capitalize
signiﬁcantly on information leakages ahead of DOL and BEA announcements. To assess
this possibility, Figure 5 plots the average number of trades and dollar volume in the
ES market for every minute of a trading day. Panels A, B, C, and D correspond to the
full sample, the non-announcement, the non-surprise announcement, and the surprise
announcement days, respectively. Across the four panels, it is clear that the futures
trading volume is substantially lower when the stock market is closed (before 9:30 a.m.
and after 4:00 p.m.). Hence, even if a trader has private information as early as 8 a.m.,
it may be hard to capitalize on it in the futures market without drawing the attention of
regulators and other investors.25 In contrast, the typical market liquidity is much higher
during FOMC lockups, which can facilitate informed trading activities.
[Figure 5 about here]
Since we ﬁnd evidence of informed trading only prior to the FOMC announcements,
we focus on these events in the rest of the paper.
25Relatedly, it is possible that informed trading ahead of DOL and BEA oﬃcial data releases would
target other markets that we are not able to examine due to data limitations. For instance, given that
macro-news also aﬀect exchange rates, it may be optimal for informed investors to trade in the OTC
FX market, the largest round-the-clock ﬁnancial market in the world.
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4.3 Zooming in on the lockup window
In this subsection, we divide the FOMC lockup window into three ten-minute periods
(labeled [-30,-20], [-20,-10], and [-10,0]) and examine the informed trading activity within
each sub-window. Table 7 reports the results.
[Table 7 about here]
Panel A of Table 7 reports the OLS estimates using the baseline model. The esti-
mates in Columns 1 and 2 show that there is no abnormal order imbalance in the ﬁrst
ten minutes of the lockup period. Although the coeﬃcient estimate of SUR is fairly large
(greater than 4) in both columns, it is not statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, the results
in Columns 3 and 4 indicate that there is a large and signiﬁcant informed order imbalance
before surprise announcements in the window [-20,-10]. Speciﬁcally, the estimated coeﬃ-
cients on SUR are 7.05 and 9.94 in the OIN and OID regressions with t-statistics of 1.89
and 2.18, respectively. In the last ten minutes leading to the announcement, the ES’s
informed order imbalance becomes slightly smaller in magnitude and only marginally sig-
niﬁcant. In Panel B of Table 7, we repeat our pre- and post-2006 analysis for the three
ten-minute sub-windows. We ﬁnd similar evidence for the pre- and post-2006 periods,
except that in the last ten-minute sub-window, there are large and signiﬁcant informed
order imbalances in the pre-2006 period, but no signiﬁcant informed order imbalance in
the post-2006 period.
4.4 Scheduled vs. Actual FOMC release time
Earlier studies (e.g., Lucca and Moench (2014), Fleming and Piazzesi (2005)) indicate
that media reports about FOMC’s announcements may in fact become publicly available
minutes ahead of the scheduled time. Although such practice itself seems in contrast
with the spirit of a lockup, it is not what gives rise to concerns about violations that
would provide some traders with an unfair (private) advantage.
To assess whether early public releases of FOMC announcements aﬀect our baseline
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results, we collect the earliest release time of media reports and newswires available on
Factiva.26 Then we repeat our analysis using the media reports’ (actual) release time
instead of the scheduled announcement time. The media reports are only stamped to the
minute. Hence, to be conservative, we assume the information reaches the market in the
ﬁrst second of the actual release minute. Table A1 in the appendix reports details about
the scheduled and actual release times for each FOMC announcement in our sample. On
average, the actual release occurs about two and half minutes earlier than the scheduled
time, even though often the actual time is few minutes later.
Not having information on the reasons for the release time discrepancy, we use two
methods to account for this discrepancy in our analysis. First, we assume the media
lockup always lasts for thirty minutes and the starting time is half an hour before the
actual release time. Panel A of Table 8 reports the results using this event time deﬁni-
tion. There is statistically signiﬁcant order imbalance in the ﬁrst twenty minutes of the
lockup period but not in the last ten minutes. Overall, the abnormal order imbalance in
the lockup period before surprise announcements is 5.79 to 7.98 percent higher with t-
statistics above 2.5. Alternatively, to account for potential delays in the release of media
reports, we also deﬁne the announcement time as the earlier of the scheduled and actual
time. Panel B reports the results of this analysis. We continue to ﬁnd that the average
order imbalance during lockups ahead of surprise announcements is highly signiﬁcant.
Next, we assume that the media lockup always starts thirty minutes before the sched-
uled release time but may end early. Hence, the length of each lockup period can vary.
We report the results of the corresponding regression analysis in Panels C and D. Since
the ﬁrst twenty minutes of this alternative lockup window are the same as those under
the original deﬁnition, the order imbalance before surprise announcements in the second
ten-minute window is always signiﬁcant as in our baseline analysis. In both panels, there
is no evidence of signiﬁcant informed trading in the last sub-window. Overall, like in the
baseline tests, the order imbalance during the whole lockup period is always abnormally
high and statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, it does not appear that the abnormal activ-
26In particular, we collect all newswires and reports from Dow Jones News Service, Reuters, and
Associated Press during the two hours around the scheduled release time.
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ities documented in our baseline tests are due to the early (public) media reports about
FOMC policy announcements.
4.5 Robustness
In this section, we present the results of several tests that we perform to assess the robust-
ness of our baseline analysis. First, we repeat our regression analysis using alternative
deﬁnitions of surprise announcements and report the results in Table 9. We begin by
using alternative thresholds to identify signiﬁcant surprises. In particular, we set the
SUR indicator equal to one, if the absolute value of the announcement surprise is above
17.5 bp (Panel A) or above 20 bp (Panel B). Increasing the surprise threshold reduces the
number of surprise announcements to only 20 in Panel A and 17 in Panel B. We focus
on the media lockup period starting thirty minutes before the scheduled release time
because our earlier results indicate that abnormal order imbalances are concentrated in
this period. We deﬁne the release time 0 as the scheduled time in Columns 1 and 2, the
actual time in Columns 3 and 4, and the earlier of the two in Columns 5 and 6. Consis-
tently across all columns, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of SUR on the order imbalances during
FOMC lockups is statistically signiﬁcant in line with our baseline results. Alternatively,
in Panel C, we use the absolute value of the announcement surprise, AbsDiﬀ, instead of
the surprise indicator, SUR. The results are again statistically signiﬁcant and consistent
with our earlier ﬁndings.
[Table 9 about here]
In Panel D, we measure the expected Federal funds rate using only Federal funds
futures contracts expiring within three months to address the concern that longer term
futures may contain irrelevant information about the approaching FOMC meeting. We
use again the baseline deﬁnition of SUR and the number of surprise announcements
reduces to 16 using this method. Nonetheless, we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant abnormal order
imbalance during the lockup period before surprise announcements regardless of the
release time, scheduled or actual.
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In Panel E, we adopt a diﬀerent strategy to measure FOMC’s announcement surprises.
Speciﬁcally, we rely on the information reﬂected in the realized ES’ announcement re-
turns to determine the extent to which the FOMC’s announcements surprise market
participants. Because informed trading during the lockup period potentially contributes
to price discovery, we calculate announcement returns over the window [-30, 1], where 0 is
the actual announcement time. Using this alternative approach, consistent with the ear-
lier evidence, we ﬁnd that the relation between order imbalances – whether measured by
number of trades or dollar volumes – and realized announcement returns is statistically
signiﬁcant during the lockup period.
In Panel F, we use the Kuttner (2001) method to measure unexpected rate changes.
By this method, there are only four announcements in our sample where the unexpected
rate change is greater than 12.5 bp. Not surprisingly, given the low power of the test,
the corresponding abnormal trading imbalances observed during the lockup window are
not statistically signiﬁcant, even though the coeﬃcient estimate on the SUR dummy is
positive and large relative to the ANN dummy coeﬃcient. To gain further insights on
these four announcements, Table A4 in the Internet Appendix reports the corresponding
order imbalances. The evidence shows that there are very large order imbalances in the
direction of the subsequent policy surprise in three out of the four events.
The evidence in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b, GSS) suggests that FOMC’s
announcements contain two distinct signals that market participants react to: the current
rate target as well as the future direction of the FOMC’s policy. In Panel G, we rely on
their method to identify target and path surprises. Given that it is less obvious how to
classify events into surprise and non-surprise announcements using the GSS method, we
use the actual continuous surprise measures in our tests. We ﬁnd that the GSS current
target rate surprise is not signiﬁcantly related to order imbalances in the lockup window.
Instead, it is the GSS policy path surprise that explains the systematic variation in ab-
normal trading activity during FOMC’s lockups. The coeﬃcient estimate suggests that
increased selling pressure in E-mini futures is associated with unanticipated tightening
policy paths. This evidence supports the notion that there are informed traders estab-
lishing positions during FOMC’s lockups to take advantage of the news contained in the
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impending announcements.
In Panels H and I, we further examine the diﬀerent eﬀects that information about
current and future target rate policy has on informed trading during FOMC’s lockups.
Speciﬁcally, we redeﬁne our baseline surprise measure by separating the current and non-
current future contracts. In line with the results in Panel G, we ﬁnd that there is little
abnormal trading activity associated with the surprise measure based on current Fed-
eral funds rate futures. Instead, the abnormal trading activity associated with surprise
announcements measured with respect to longer term contracts is large and statistically
signiﬁcant. Nonetheless, our baseline results indicate that using both current and longer
term futures identiﬁes surprises that are associated with greater abnormal activity, both
statistically and economically.
Next, we examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the deﬁnition of policy
surprises during the QE period - i.e., October 2008-June 2013. During this period, the
FOMC announced target rates in the form of a range, rather than a point estimate. In
Panel A of Table 10, we use the midpoint of the range, rather than its lower and upper
bounds, to deﬁne surprises. For the period before October 2008, we retain the same
baseline deﬁnition of surprise announcement used in Table 5. Adopting this approach
increases the number of FOMC surprise announcements to 38. Although our inferences
remain unchanged, the economic and statistical signiﬁcance of our results decreases some-
what, suggesting that the additional surprise events add noise to our tests.
During the QE period, in addition to its target rate policy, the FOMC announcements
contained arguably important information about the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset
purchase programs (i.e., QE1, QE2, and QE3). This additional information in FOMC
releases may contaminate our baseline deﬁnition of surprise announcements. To address
this concern, in Panel B of Table 10, we use the realized changes in the 10-Year treasury
rates to deﬁne surprises after October 1, 2008, while keeping the same deﬁnition based
on Federal funds target rates before that date. When we use this alternative approach to
deﬁne surprise announcements for the QE period, our main inferences remain the same.
[Table 10 about here]
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4.6 Asymmetric impact of macro-news on informed trading?
A natural question is whether good and bad news associated with FOMC announcements
have the same eﬀect. To investigate this issue, we use two separate dummies: Bad, which
equals one when the announced Federal funds target rate is above the expectation by
at least 12.5 bp and zero otherwise, and Good, which equals one when the announced
Federal funds target rate is below the expectation by at least 12.5 bp and zero otherwise.
Based on this classiﬁcation, of the 25 surprise announcements, six are bad news surprises
(Bad = 1) and 19 are good news surprises (Good = 1). We replace the SUR dummy
with these two separate indicators in our baseline regressions. Table 11 reports the OLS
regression results for the E-mini S&P 500 futures.
[Table 11 about here]
The evidence in Table 11 suggests that the impact of FOMC surprises on informed
trading activity during lockups is asymmetric. On the one hand, we ﬁnd large and
statistically signiﬁcant positive order imbalances during lockups ahead of good news
surprises, with magnitudes ranging from 6.98% to 12.89% depending on the deﬁnition
of release time and the measure of trading activity. On the other hand, for bad news
surprises, we ﬁnd no abnormal selling pressure in the lockup window, possibly due to the
small sample size.
A potential explanation for the asymmetric eﬀect of good and bad news may be the
existence of short-sale constraints in the underlying stock market. Such constraints would
aﬀect the ability of liquidity providers in the futures markets to hedge their positions
and thus limit privately informed traders’ ability to trade. Another possibility is that
informed traders rely on limit orders ahead of bad news surprises, rather than market
orders - as in Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2014). This, in turn, would prevent
us from correctly identifying the direction of their trades based on conventional empirical
methods (i.e., the tick-rule or the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm).
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4.7 Price impact
In this subsection, we investigate the price impact of informed trading around the FOMC
announcements. If uninformed investors expect informed trading during lockups, then
prices should incorporate the information in the order ﬂow and the corresponding ab-
normal returns would provide a measure of informed trading. In contrast, if informed
trading is regarded as unlikely and/or it is diﬃcult for uninformed traders to observe
the order ﬂow and extract the price information, prices may not immediately reﬂect the
information. To examine this issue, we replace the dependent variable in our baseline
regressions with cumulative returns and report the results in Table 12.
[Table 12 about here]
In Panel A of Table 12, we deﬁne 0 as the scheduled release time. Columns 1 to 3
report the results separately for the pre-lockup, lockup, and post-lockup periods similar
to Table 5, while Columns 4 to 6 repeat the analysis for the three ten-minute subwindows
during the lockup. The coeﬃcient estimates on ANN are largely insigniﬁcant across all
columns except the last one. The SUR coeﬃcient estimate is signiﬁcantly positive in the
lockup period, Column 2, but not so before or after the lockup. The large price run-up of
22.15 bp is associated with a t-statistic of 4.05, consistent with active informed trading
only during the lockup period. Columns 4 to 6 show that the large price run-up occurs
mainly in the last few minutes leading to the announcement. Given the discrepancy
between scheduled and actual release times, in Panel B, we deﬁne 0 as the actual release
time and ﬁnd that the large price run-up disappears. The post-announcement return is
large but not statistically signiﬁcant. Panel C shows similar results when we deﬁne 0 as
the earlier of the scheduled and the actual release time.
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant price run-ups prior to the public release
of surprise FOMC announcements. Considering the signiﬁcant abnormal order imbalance
documented earlier, this result suggests that informed traders are able to trade without
moving the market and earn most of their proﬁts after the announcement. Importantly,
the price run-up diﬀerence in Panels A and B shows that a few minutes’ information
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advantage can in fact result in large potential proﬁts.
The lack of signiﬁcant abnormal returns in the lockup window may be because the
announcement dummies do not reﬂect the diﬀerent levels of informed trading and thus do
not capture the contribution of the latter to price discovery. To examine this conjecture,
we investigate the relation between informed order ﬂow and price discovery following
the analysis of Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) in the context of analysts’ tipping.
Speciﬁcally, in Table 13, we regress the order imbalance during the 126 FOMC’s lockup
periods on the contemporaneous return and the subsequent return measured at one,
ﬁve, ten, or thirty minutes after each actual announcement. Regardless of the measure
of order imbalance and the deﬁnition of announcement returns, the results consistently
show two patterns. First, the contemporaneous price impact of the order imbalance is
always positive and signiﬁcant. For example, in Column 1, the coeﬃcient estimate of the
contemporaneous return is 62.89 with a t-statistic of 2.90. Second, none of the subsequent
announcement returns is signiﬁcantly associated with the order imbalance during the
lockup although the sign is generally negative. Overall, this evidence is consistent with
informed trading during FOMC lockups contributing to contemporaneous price discovery
as microstructure theory would suggest.
[Table 13 about here]
4.8 Other testing securities
In this subsection, we turn our attention to the abnormal trading activities that may
take place in other asset markets. For the reasons explained in the previous section, we
examine the trading activity in the E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures (NQ), the SPDR S&P 500
ETF (SPY), the Power-Shares QQQ ETF (QQQ), the 2-Year US Treasury Note futures
(TU), the 10-Year US Treasury Note futures (TY), and the gold futures (GC) during
the lockup period. Speciﬁcally, we repeat our main tests using these additional securities
and present the results in Table 14.
[Table 14 about here]
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The starting time of the lockup is always set to thirty minutes before the scheduled
release time and the ending time is the scheduled time in Columns 1 to 3, the actual
time in Columns 4 to 6, and the earlier of the two in Columns 7 to 9. The table
reports results for abnormal returns in addition to order imbalances. Similar to our main
testing security (ES), Panels A, B, and C show that there are signiﬁcant informed order
imbalances in other equity-related markets (NQ, SPY, and QQQ) during FOMC lockups.
In the treasury futures market, the short-term contract experiences signiﬁcant abnormal
order imbalance during the same period but the long-term contract does not show any
evidence of informed trading. We do not ﬁnd informed trading in the gold futures market
either. Although the patterns across all markets is similar to those documented for the
ES, the results are somewhat less signiﬁcant both statistically and economically. This,
in turn, is consistent with the premise of our analysis that liquidity is a major concern of
traders that may have a short-term information advantage, even though they may spread
their trades across several markets.
4.9 Informed traders’ profits
To gauge the economic signiﬁcance of informed trading activity during FOMC lockups,
we estimate the hypothetical proﬁts of informed trades executed ahead of the 25 surprise
announcements in our baseline analysis. For this purpose, we assume informed traders
receive the information thirty minutes before the scheduled release time and trade in the
direction of the policy surprise until the news becomes public - i.e., earliest release time
of press reports. We compute the proﬁt for all trades executed in each second using the
volume-weighted trade price and choose three arbitrary times at which the traders may
unwind their positions: ﬁve, ten, and thirty minutes after the actual release time.
We follow two diﬀerent approaches when aggregating informed trades’ proﬁts to ob-
tain a lower bound and an upper bound. The lower bound of our estimate assumes that
the informed traders use market orders and only the imbalance portion of the trading
volume that we observe reﬂects informed traders’ activity. The upper bound assumes
that there is an informed trader behind every transaction executed during the lockup
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window, be it via a market order or a limit order.
Panel A of Table 15 presents summary statistics of the informed traders’ proﬁt es-
timates in the E-mini S&P 500 futures. The lower bound of the proﬁts for pre-release
informed trades executed during the average lockup prior to a surprise announcement
is $139,398 ($347,761) assuming the positions are liquidated ﬁve (thirty) minutes after
the actual release. The upper bound of the estimated proﬁts is notably larger. The
average upper bound per surprise announcement is as high as 8.3 million dollars when
we assume informed traders unwind their positions ten minutes after the news becomes
public. When aggregated across all FOMC surprise announcements, the proﬁt estimates
range between 2.5 and 207.5 million dollars on the S&P 500 futures market alone. Panel
B of Table 15 provides similar estimates of trading proﬁts across all the markets that we
examine. Although the estimates in Panel B are generally larger than those in Panel A,
the diﬀerence is not very large, indicating that the activity in the E-mini S&P 500 futures
market dominates that in other markets, consistent with the premise of our analysis.
[Table 15 about here]
5 Conclusion
In this study, we use high frequency trading data to investigate whether there is
informed trading ahead of macro-news announcements. We ﬁnd robust evidence of in-
formed trading, as measured by order imbalance of equity index futures and exchange-
traded funds, during the lockup periods ahead of FOMC announcements. Based on our
estimates across all the markets that we examine, the aggregate dollar proﬁts of informed
trades during lockups prior to FOMC surprise announcements range between $4.5 and
$210.5 million.
The evidence of informed trading during FOMC’s lockups is consistent with informa-
tion leakage directly from the news media or from other insiders mimicking such behavior.
It is also possible that some investors have superior ability to predict and trade ahead
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of impending macro-news announcements. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that such ac-
tivity would correspond systematically and exclusively with the media lockup periods of
FOMC’s policy announcements. Overall, our evidence demonstrates at the very least the
existence of a systematic link between informed trading activities in capital markets and
the FOMC’s embargo practices.
Recent government investigations and media attention has focused on the possibility
that some news agencies would violate news embargoes of government agencies such as
DOL. However, we ﬁnd no evidence to support those concerns for the asset markets that
we can examine in conjunction with the release of nonfarm payroll, CPI, and GDP data.
Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the lack of evidence in the futures market does
not prove absence of information leakage. Admittedly, it is possible that informed trades
are routed to other markets that are more liquid during after-hour trading - e.g., OTC
FX market, which we cannot analyze due to data limitations. We leave further analysis
of this issue to future research.
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Table 1: Information about macroeconomic announcements
The table provides institutional details about the four types of macroeconomic an-
nouncements in this study. FOMC, DOL, and BEA stand for the Federal Open Market
Committee, the Department of Labor, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, respec-
tively. All times are Eastern Standard Time.
Announcement Source Frequency Type Units Scheduled release time (EST)
Federal Funds FOMC 8 per year Level Percent (%) 2:15 p.m. (occasionally
Target Rate 12:30 p.m. or 2 p.m.)
Nonfarm Payrolls DOL Monthly Change Thousands 8:30 a.m.
CPI DOL Monthly Change Percent (%) 8:30 a.m.
GDP BEA Monthly Change Percent (%) 8:30 a.m.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the announcement surprise
The table presents the statistics of the diﬀerence between the expected (Exp) and
actual (Act) macroeconomic indicators between September 9, 1997 and June 30, 2013.
The expected Federal funds target rate is the volume-weighted implied rate from the
CME Federal funds futures at one day before the announcement date. The expected
values of nonfarm payroll, CPI, and GDP are the median of the economist forecasts from
the Blue Chip Economic Indicators Survey. The actual Federal funds target rate after
October 2008 is the mid point of the target range. Diﬀ is calculated as Act minus Exp
except for the Federal funds target rate after October 2008, which is calculated as the
lower bound of the target range minus Exp if Exp is below the lower bound, Exp minus
the upper bound if Exp is above the upper bound, and zero otherwise. AbsDiﬀ is the
absolute value of Diﬀ.
Statistics N Mean St. dev. Median Minimum Maximum
Panel A: FOMC
Exp 126 2.734 2.236 2.013 0.071 6.572
Act 126 2.679 2.248 2.000 0.125 6.500
Diﬀ 126 -0.037 0.124 -0.010 -0.450 0.455
AbsDiﬀ 126 0.083 0.099 0.059 0.000 0.455
Panel B: Nonfarm payroll
Exp 189 82.185 181.112 125 -650 513
Act 189 63.820 201.633 94 -663 519
Diﬀ 189 -18.365 95.911 -13 -330 459
AbsDiﬀ 189 70.841 67.029 59 0 459
Panel C: CPI
Exp 189 0.204 0.244 0.200 -1.200 0.900
Act 189 0.192 0.325 0.200 -1.700 1.200
Diﬀ 189 -0.012 0.142 0.000 -0.700 0.400
AbsDiﬀ 189 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.700
Panel D: GDP
Exp 189 2.583 2.293 2.800 -6.500 8.200
Act 189 2.560 2.352 2.700 -6.300 8.200
Diﬀ 189 -0.023 0.559 0.000 -3.400 1.600
AbsDiﬀ 189 0.369 0.420 0.200 0.000 3.400
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Table 3: Annual breakdown of macro announcements
The table presents the time-series distribution of macroeconomic announcements classiﬁed
as surprise or non-surprise to the market from September 9, 1997 to June 30, 2013. A FOMC
announcement is deﬁned as a surprise (SUR=1) if the actual announced target rate deviates
from the futures-implied rate by at least 12.5 basis points. For the other types of macroeconomic
indicators, an event is classiﬁed as a surprise (SUR=1) if the actual value is outside the 10th
to 90th percentiles of the economist forecasts from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators Survey.
FOMC Nonfarm payroll CPI GDP
Year SUR=0 SUR=1 SUR=0 SUR=1 SUR=0 SUR=1 SUR=0 SUR=1
1997 2 1 2 1 1 3 4 0
1998 8 0 9 3 5 7 6 6
1999 6 2 8 4 7 5 8 3
2000 6 2 7 5 9 2 7 5
2001 6 2 7 5 10 2 9 3
2002 6 2 12 0 11 1 8 4
2003 8 0 9 3 5 7 8 4
2004 4 4 5 7 7 5 8 4
2005 1 7 9 3 7 5 11 1
2006 7 1 9 3 9 3 9 3
2007 7 1 10 2 12 0 10 2
2008 5 3 6 6 7 5 8 4
2009 7 0 6 6 9 3 8 4
2010 8 0 7 5 11 1 11 1
2011 8 0 7 5 8 4 11 1
2012 8 0 12 0 11 1 9 3
2013 4 0 5 1 3 3 2 4
SUM 101 25 130 59 132 57 137 52
Total 126 189 189 189
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Table 4: Description of the E-mini S&P500 market around the announcement
This table reports the summary statistics of the cumulative returns and order imbal-
ances of the E-mini S&P500 futures around the macroeconomic announcement. For each
macroeconomic announcement, the previous 21 trading days are used as control days
(ANN=0). In Panel A, an FOMC announcement is deﬁned as a surprise (SUR=1) if the
actual announced target rate deviates from the futures-implied rate by at least 12.5 basis
points. For the other types of macroeconomic announcements in Panels B, C, and D, an
event is classiﬁed as a surprise (SUR=1) if the actual value is outside the 10th to 90th
percentiles of the economist forecasts from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators Survey.
The E-mini S&P 500 futures data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) are
used to calculate the variables of interest. Return is the cumulative return in basis point
calculated using volume-weighted transaction prices. OIN represents the order imbal-
ance deﬁned as B-S/(B+S), where B (S) is the number of trades initiated by the buyer
(seller). OID is calculated similarly to OIN using dollar trading volume instead of num-
ber of trades. Three event periods are examined around the announcement: [-60,-30],
from one hour before to half an hour before the scheduled announcement; [-30,0], from
half hour before to the scheduled release time; and [0,60], from the scheduled release time
to one hour afterwards. For observations in the surprise announcement group (SUR=1),
the signs of the return and order imbalance variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects
of a market-positive surprise.
Mean Standard deviation Median
Period OIN OID Return OIN OID Return OIN OID Return
Panel A: FOMC
ANN=0 [-60,-30] 0.119 -0.308 0.602 12.036 14.574 24.945 0.000 -0.638 0.548
[-30,0] -0.527 -0.584 -0.970 10.006 12.944 24.402 -0.434 -0.832 -0.041
[0,60] -0.110 -0.094 1.519 6.503 9.105 43.010 -0.142 -0.430 1.116
SUR=0 [-60,-30] -0.448 0.922 1.970 11.493 15.037 15.648 0.532 1.384 0.000
[-30,0] -0.513 -0.098 -5.116 10.025 11.238 24.582 -0.690 -0.285 -1.678
[0,60] -0.569 0.094 8.685 4.163 6.506 69.733 -0.309 0.703 9.297
SUR=1 [-60,-30] -0.790 -4.494 0.323 12.077 19.150 15.687 1.038 -2.492 -2.151
[-30,0] 7.913 9.268 17.038 11.208 13.538 31.836 9.034 8.680 8.813
[0,60] -0.313 0.066 2.607 4.387 7.934 104.141 -0.629 -0.927 0.000
Panel B: Nonfarm Payroll
ANN=0 [-60,-30] 0.559 0.669 -0.060 21.416 26.203 14.921 0.000 0.059 0.038
[-30,0] 0.107 0.496 0.173 16.197 20.891 17.346 0.000 0.064 0.010
[0,60] -1.324 -1.496 -1.800 10.684 14.249 26.614 -1.055 -1.376 -1.648
SUR=0 [-60,-30] 0.109 1.066 0.573 19.612 23.718 9.972 0.262 0.873 0.000
[-30,0] 2.475 4.641 5.986 11.778 14.030 13.688 2.583 2.963 6.030
[0,60] 0.152 1.147 5.305 6.861 10.740 53.624 0.062 0.390 6.728
SUR=1 [-60,-30] -4.340 -2.850 1.359 18.700 24.259 16.757 -1.653 -4.166 0.000
[-30,0] -1.037 -0.619 0.054 12.554 16.445 21.659 -0.008 0.145 -1.916
[0,60] 0.042 2.170 27.196 7.004 8.835 68.281 0.966 4.809 30.775
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Table 4 (continued):
Mean Standard deviation Median
Period OIN OID Return OIN OID Return OIN OID Return
Panel C: CPI
ANN=0 [-60,-30] 0.656 0.773 -0.053 21.330 26.122 14.872 0.000 0.264 0.035
[-30,0] 0.102 0.480 0.126 16.284 20.905 17.371 0.000 0.053 0.000
[0,60] -1.342 -1.477 -1.764 10.695 14.241 26.647 -1.065 -1.352 -1.648
SUR=0 [-60,-30] -0.409 0.996 -1.933 18.349 22.650 14.981 -2.134 -1.529 -0.394
[-30,0] 2.121 3.171 2.987 15.006 17.631 12.945 0.510 3.952 1.300
[0,60] -0.393 0.009 2.193 7.841 11.213 33.550 -0.901 -0.085 -1.373
SUR=1 [-60,-30] -1.820 -3.554 -1.440 22.901 29.482 15.453 -2.564 -1.778 0.000
[-30,0] 0.046 1.210 2.477 14.290 17.129 16.574 1.238 0.754 1.346
[0,60] 1.312 2.421 14.055 8.660 12.280 43.557 0.683 2.369 9.727
Panel D: GDP
ANN=0 [-60,-30] 0.575 0.688 -0.062 21.238 26.001 14.954 0.000 0.162 0.043
[-30,0] 0.061 0.400 0.082 16.267 20.875 17.415 0.000 0.018 0.000
[0,60] -1.342 -1.486 -1.745 10.675 14.188 26.585 -1.055 -1.352 -1.639
SUR=0 [-60,-30] 0.745 2.851 0.448 18.739 25.097 14.650 0.429 1.721 0.000
[-30,0] 1.539 3.426 4.408 14.847 20.133 18.989 0.680 3.544 2.698
[0,60] 0.243 0.168 -0.542 9.030 12.875 29.258 -0.156 -0.996 -3.910
SUR=1 [-60,-30] 1.390 1.049 -1.185 20.750 24.124 14.960 2.227 0.826 -1.079
[-30,0] 1.083 1.654 2.358 10.974 17.625 15.355 2.181 5.500 3.005
[0,60] 3.591 5.917 21.826 6.909 8.527 51.689 2.419 4.339 14.327
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Table 5: OLS regressions on announcement type dummies
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market. The
dependent variables are the order imbalances calculated using both number of trades (OIN)
and dollar volume (OID) in three event windows: [-60,-30], [-30,0], and [0,60], where 0 is the
scheduled release time. Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4. For observations in the
surprise announcement group, the signs of the order imbalance variables are adjusted to reﬂect
the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise. Panels A to D report separate regression results for
announcements on the Federal funds target rate, nonfarm payroll, CPI, and GDP, respectively.
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last row of each panel reports the
p-value of the Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients of ANN and SUR equals to zero.
Period [-60,-30] [-30,0] [0,60]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel A: FOMC
Intercept 0.126 -0.308 -0.524 -0.584 -0.109 -0.094
(0.52) (-1.05) (-2.60) (-2.25) (-0.84) (-0.52)
ANN -0.574 1.230 0.012 0.486 -0.460 0.188
(-0.47) (0.83) (0.01) (0.37) (-0.71) (0.21)
SUR -0.342 -5.416 8.425 9.366 0.256 -0.029
(-0.13) (-1.66) (3.76) (3.25) (0.18) (-0.01)
ANN+SUR -0.916 -4.186 8.437 9.852 -0.204 0.159
p-value 0.7045 0.155 <.0001 0.0001 0.8743 0.9299
Panel B: Nonfarm payroll
Intercept 0.559 0.669 0.107 0.496 -1.324 -1.496
(1.50) (1.46) (0.38) (1.37) (-7.19) (-6.07)
ANN -0.450 0.396 2.368 4.145 1.475 2.642
(-0.24) (0.17) (1.66) (2.25) (1.57) (2.10)
SUR -4.448 -3.916 -3.512 -5.260 -0.109 1.024
(-1.33) (-0.96) (-1.40) (-1.63) (-0.07) (0.46)
ANN+SUR -4.899 -3.520 -1.144 -1.115 1.366 3.666
p-value 0.0802 0.3043 0.5862 0.6804 0.3227 0.0472
46
Table 5 (continued):
Period [-60,-30] [-30,0] [0,60]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel C: CPI
Intercept 0.656 0.773 0.102 0.480 -1.342 -1.477
(1.77) (1.70) (0.36) (1.32) (-7.27) (-5.99)
ANN -1.065 0.223 2.018 2.692 0.949 1.486
(-0.56) (0.10) (1.40) (1.46) (1.01) (1.19)
SUR -1.411 -4.550 -2.075 -1.961 1.705 2.412
(-0.42) (-1.10) (-0.81) (-0.60) (1.02) (1.08)
ANN+SUR -2.476 -4.327 -0.056 0.730 2.654 3.898
p-value 0.3833 0.2140 0.9792 0.7921 0.0602 0.0387
Panel D: GDP
Intercept 0.575 0.688 0.061 0.400 -1.342 -1.486
(1.55) (1.51) (0.22) (1.10) (-7.24) (-6.02)
ANN 0.170 2.163 1.478 3.026 1.585 1.654
(0.09) (0.96) (1.05) (1.67) (1.72) (1.35)
SUR 0.645 -1.802 -0.456 -1.771 3.347 5.749
(0.19) (-0.43) (-0.17) (-0.52) (1.94) (2.51)
ANN+SUR 0.815 0.361 1.022 1.254 4.933 7.403
p-value 0.7827 0.9207 0.6507 0.6662 0.0008 0.0002
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Table 6: Informed trading before and after 2006
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market over
subperiods before and after 2006. The dependent variables are the order imbalances calculated
using both number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID) in three event windows: [-60,-30],
[-30,0], and [0,60], where 0 is the scheduled release time. Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in
Table 4. For observations in the surprise announcement group, the signs of the order imbalance
variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise. Panels A to D report
separate regression results for announcements on the Federal funds target rate, nonfarm payroll,
CPI, and GDP, respectively. Post is a dummy equal to one for observations after January 1,
2006 and zero otherwise. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last row
of each panel reports the p-value of the Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients of ANN*Post
and SUR*Post equals to zero.
Period [-60,-30] [-30,0] [0,60]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel A: FOMC
Intercept -0.267 -0.819 -0.505 -0.855 -0.273 -0.793
(-0.81) (-2.03) (-1.83) (-2.40) (-1.54) (-3.20)
ANN -1.611 1.253 -0.644 -0.104 -1.063 -0.933
(-0.90) (0.58) (-0.43) (-0.05) (-1.12) (-0.70)
SUR 3.121 -3.415 10.286 10.486 1.157 2.248
(0.97) (-0.87) (3.84) (3.05) (0.68) (0.94)
Post 0.837 1.087 -0.041 0.577 0.349 1.487
(1.73) (1.85) (-0.10) (1.11) (1.35) (4.12)
ANN*Post 1.839 -0.173 1.231 1.034 1.085 1.916
(0.75) (-0.06) (0.60) (0.39) (0.83) (1.05)
SUR*Post -12.841 -8.478 -7.312 -2.907 -2.104 -5.687
(-1.99) (-1.08) (-1.36) (-0.42) (-0.61) (-1.18)
(ANN+SUR)*Post -11.002 -8.650 -6.081 -1.874 -1.019 -3.771
p-value 0.0678 0.2388 0.2265 0.7720 0.7515 0.4024
Panel B: Nonfarm payroll
Intercept 1.548 2.158 0.447 0.813 -1.581 -2.082
(3.01) (3.43) (1.16) (1.63) (-6.23) (-6.14)
ANN -1.582 -1.726 3.750 5.039 2.399 2.859
(-0.60) (-0.54) (1.90) (1.98) (1.85) (1.65)
SUR -8.074 -4.083 -5.566 -7.216 -0.164 0.183
(-1.75) (-0.72) (-1.61) (-1.62) (-0.07) (0.06)
Post -2.089 -3.146 -0.719 -0.670 0.544 1.240
(-2.79) (-3.44) (-1.28) (-0.93) (1.48) (2.51)
ANN*Post 2.389 4.474 -2.891 -1.869 -1.942 -0.464
(0.63) (0.96) (-1.01) (-0.51) (-1.03) (-0.18)
SUR*Post 7.640 0.358 4.309 4.108 0.108 1.776
(1.14) (0.04) (0.86) (0.63) (0.03) (0.40)
(ANN+SUR)*Post 10.030 4.832 1.418 2.240 -1.834 1.311
p-value 0.0802 0.3043 0.5862 0.6804 0.3227 0.0472
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Table 6 (continued):
Period [-60,-30] [-30,0] [0,60]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel C: CPI
Intercept 1.757 2.380 0.484 0.847 -1.583 -2.081
(3.42) (3.78) (1.24) (1.69) (-6.20) (-6.11)
ANN -1.533 -0.747 4.370 3.883 1.631 1.095
(-0.56) (-0.22) (2.09) (1.45) (1.19) (0.60)
SUR -3.154 -5.787 -5.393 -4.853 0.913 2.999
(-0.72) (-1.07) (-1.60) (-1.13) (0.42) (1.02)
Post -2.303 -3.363 -0.799 -0.768 0.505 1.264
(-3.10) (-3.69) (-1.41) (-1.06) (1.37) (2.56)
ANN*Post 1.109 2.160 -4.355 -2.171 -1.336 0.611
(0.29) (0.47) (-1.51) (-0.59) (-0.71) (0.24)
SUR*Post 4.356 2.911 6.821 6.737 1.833 -0.715
(0.63) (0.34) (1.28) (0.99) (0.53) (-0.15)
(ANN+SUR)*Post 5.465 5.071 2.466 4.566 0.498 -0.103
p-value 0.3833 0.214 0.9792 0.7921 0.0602 0.03870
Panel D: GDP
Intercept 1.521 2.075 0.428 0.680 -1.607 -2.129
(2.97) (3.30) (1.09) (1.35) (-6.27) (-6.24)
ANN 2.084 3.795 3.875 6.740 2.817 2.831
(0.80) (1.19) (1.95) (2.64) (2.17) (1.64)
SUR 0.083 -2.053 -2.695 -2.725 3.982 6.585
(0.02) (-0.36) (-0.76) (-0.60) (1.72) (2.14)
Post -1.982 -2.906 -0.770 -0.586 0.555 1.348
(-2.67) (-3.19) (-1.36) (-0.80) (1.50) (2.73)
ANN*Post -3.78 -3.177 -4.799 -7.460 -2.504 -2.425
(-1.03) (-0.70) (-1.70) (-2.06) (-1.36) (-0.99)
SUR*Post 0.330 -0.461 4.330 0.861 -1.838 -2.163
(0.05) (-0.05) (0.82) (0.13) (-0.53) (-0.47)
(ANN+SUR)*Post -3.450 -3.638 -0.470 -6.599 -4.342 -4.588
p-value 0.7827 0.9207 0.6507 0.6662 0.0008 0.0002
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Table 7: Further investigation into the lockup window
This table presents OLS regression results for FOMC announcements. The dependent vari-
ables are the order imbalances calculated using both number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume
(OID) in three sub-windows of the lockup period: [-30,-20], [-20,-10], and [-10,0], where 0 is the
scheduled release time. Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4. For observations in the
surprise announcement group, the signs of the order imbalance variables are adjusted to reﬂect
the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise. In Panels A and B, we repeat the analysis in Table 5
and 6 on E-mini S&P 500 futures. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
last row of each panel reports the p-value of the associated Wald test.
Period [-30,-20] [-20,-10] [-10,0]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel A: Sub-windows during the lockup period
Intercept -0.539 -0.731 -0.534 -0.598 -0.773 -0.978
(-1.61) (-1.79) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-2.35) (-2.52)
ANN -1.129 -0.970 1.682 0.905 0.813 2.317
(-0.67) (-0.47) (0.99) (0.44) (0.49) (1.18)
SUR 4.444 5.876 7.053 9.936 6.637 6.983
(1.19) (1.30) (1.89) (2.18) (1.82) (1.61)
ANN+SUR 3.316 4.907 8.735 10.841 7.450 9.300
p-value 0.3233 0.2294 0.0093 0.0082 0.0236 0.0169
Panel B: Sub-windows before and after 2006
Intercept -1.019 -1.725 0.060 -0.312 -1.025 -1.244
(-2.22) (-3.09) (0.13) (-0.56) (-2.28) (-2.34)
ANN 0.686 0.819 0.327 0.332 -1.240 -0.069
(0.28) (0.28) (0.13) (0.11) (-0.52) (-0.02)
SUR 4.007 4.985 7.514 9.801 10.681 10.474
(0.91) (0.93) (1.70) (1.81) (2.46) (2.04)
Post 0.985 2.065 -1.331 -0.680 0.558 0.580
(1.47) (2.54) (-1.98) (-0.83) (0.85) (0.75)
ANN*Post -3.220 -2.974 2.391 0.735 3.842 4.154
(-0.96) (-0.73) (0.71) (0.18) (1.17) (1.07)
SUR*Post -2.251 1.391 0.442 2.057 -13.091 -8.928
(-0.25) (0.13) (0.05) (0.19) (-1.49) (-0.86)
(ANN+SUR)*Post -1.267 3.457 -0.889 1.377 -12.534 -8.348
p-value 0.5131 0.8764 0.7352 0.7849 0.2594 0.6227
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Table 8: Scheduled and actual release time
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market using
diﬀerent announcement time for FOMC announcements. The dependent variables are
the order imbalances calculated using both number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume
(OID) during the media lockup period. Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4.
For observations in the surprise announcement group, the signs of the order imbalance
variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise. In Panel A and
C, time 0 is the earliest actual release time recorded by the Dow Jones, Bloomberg, and
Reuters Newswires. In Panel B and D, time 0 is set to be the earlier of the scheduled and
the actual release time. Both Panels A and B investigate three ten-minute subwindows
before the event time. Both Panels C and D investigate the event period starting thirty
minutes before the scheduled release time so that the last subwindow can be longer or
shorter than ten minutes. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
last row of each panel reports the p-value of the Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients
of ANN and SUR equals to zero.
Period [-30,-20] [-20,-10] [-10,0] [-30,0]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel A: Time 0 is the actual release time
Intercept -0.419 -0.463 -0.744 -0.794 -0.707 -0.824 -0.555 -0.544
(-1.22) (-1.12) (-2.22) (-1.94) (-2.12) (-2.06) (-2.72) (-2.08)
ANN -0.825 -1.060 1.166 0.331 3.599 5.138 1.328 1.253
(-0.48) (-0.51) (0.69) (0.16) (2.13) (2.54) (1.29) (0.95)
SUR 6.901 10.361 6.596 7.484 1.895 2.766 5.791 7.983
(1.81) (2.25) (1.77) (1.65) (0.51) (0.62) (2.55) (2.74)
ANN+SUR 6.076 9.301 7.762 7.815 5.494 7.904 7.119 9.236
p-value 0.0762 0.0246 0.0209 0.056 0.1002 0.0482 0.0005 0.0004
Panel B: Time 0 is the MIN{scheduled time, actual time}
Intercept -0.638 -0.792 -0.530 -0.613 -0.776 -0.964 -0.555 -0.611
(-1.87) (-1.91) (-1.58) (-1.49) (-2.34) (-2.45) (-2.73) (-2.34)
ANN -1.018 -0.834 1.253 0.180 3.192 4.850 1.046 1.155
(-0.59) (-0.40) (0.74) (0.09) (1.90) (2.43) (1.02) (0.88)
SUR 3.672 4.537 7.837 10.540 3.957 4.708 6.068 7.780
(0.97) (0.99) (2.10) (2.31) (1.07) (1.07) (2.69) (2.68)
ANN+SUR 2.654 3.703 9.09 10.72 7.149 9.558 7.114 8.935
p-value 0.4365 0.3716 0.0069 0.009 0.0314 0.0155 0.0005 0.0006
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Table 8 (continued):
Period [-30,-20] [-20,-10] [-10, t] [-30,t]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel C: Time 0 is the scheduled release time and t is the actual release time
Intercept -0.539 -0.731 -0.534 -0.598 -0.862 -1.033 -0.543 -0.562
(-1.61) (-1.79) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-2.52) (-2.54) (-2.66) (-2.14)
ANN -1.129 -0.970 1.682 0.905 3.100 4.435 1.255 1.219
(-0.67) (-0.47) (0.99) (0.44) (1.80) (2.15) (1.22) (0.92)
SUR 4.444 5.876 7.053 9.936 3.082 4.229 5.309 7.504
(1.19) (1.30) (1.89) (2.18) (0.81) (0.93) (2.34) (2.57)
ANN+SUR 3.315 4.906 8.735 10.841 6.182 8.664 6.564 8.723
p-value 0.3233 0.2294 0.0093 0.0082 0.0705 0.0338 0.0013 0.0009
Panel D: Time 0 is the scheduled release time and t is MIN{scheduled time, actual time}
Intercept -0.539 -0.731 -0.534 -0.598 -0.854 -1.071 -0.535 -0.589
(-1.61) (-1.79) (-1.59) (-1.46) (-2.46) (-2.60) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN -1.129 -0.970 1.682 0.905 2.879 4.378 1.024 1.148
(-0.67) (-0.47) (0.99) (0.44) (1.64) (2.10) (0.99) (0.86)
SUR 4.444 5.876 7.053 9.936 4.521 5.546 6.152 8.203
(1.19) (1.30) (1.89) (2.18) (1.17) (1.21) (2.69) (2.80)
ANN+SUR 3.315 4.906 8.735 10.841 7.4 9.924 7.176 9.351
p-value 0.3233 0.2294 0.0093 0.0082 0.0333 0.0161 0.0005 0.0004
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Table 9: Alternative surprise deﬁnitions
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market with
alternative surprise deﬁnitions for FOMC announcements. The dependent variables are the
order imbalances calculated using both number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID) during
the media lockup period. We ﬁx the lockup starting time to thirty minutes before the scheduled
release time and the ending time is set to the scheduled release time in Columns 1 and 2, the
actual time in Columns 3 and 4, and the earlier of the two in Columns 5 and 6. Variables
ANN is deﬁned in Table 4. For observations in the surprise announcement group, the signs of
the order imbalance variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise.
In Panel A, SUR is equal to one when the actual announced target rate deviates from the
futures-implied rate by at least 17.5 basis points. In Panel B, SUR is equal to one when
the actual announced target rate deviates from the futures-implied rate by at least 20 basis
points. In Panel C, ABSDIFF is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the expected
and actual Federal funds target rates. In Panel D, we use only the Federal funds rate futures
expiring in three months to calculate the expected target rate and the SUR is deﬁned as in
Table 4. In Panel E, ANNRET is the cumulative return of the ES from 30 minutes before
the announcement to one minute after. Panels F and G use the surprise deﬁnitions of Kuttner
(2001) and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b), respectively. Panels H and I use the current
month and non-current month Federal funds future contracts to calculate the announcement
surprise, respectively. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last row of
Panels A, B, D, F, H, and I reports the p-value of the Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients
of ANN and SUR equals to zero.
Event time Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel A: SUR=1 if AbsDiﬀ>17.5 bp, 20 surprises
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.14) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN 0.500 1.050 1.552 1.637 1.367 1.633
(0.50) (0.82) (1.54) (1.26) (1.35) (1.26)
SUR 7.458 8.152 4.768 6.746 5.523 7.198
(3.05) (2.59) (1.93) (2.11) (2.21) (2.25)
ANN+SUR 7.958 9.202 6.32 8.383 6.89 8.831
p-value 0.0004 0.0015 0.0056 0.0044 0.0027 0.0027
Panel B: SUR=1 if AbsDiﬀ>20 bp, 17 surprises
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.13) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN 0.721 1.349 1.756 1.918 1.577 1.915
(0.73) (1.07) (1.77) (1.50) (1.58) (1.49)
SUR 7.784 8.046 4.743 6.521 5.594 7.046
(2.98) (2.39) (1.79) (1.91) (2.10) (2.06)
ANN+SUR 8.505 9.395 6.499 8.439 7.171 8.961
p-value 0.0005 0.0028 0.0086 0.0082 0.004 0.005
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Table 9 (continued):
Event time Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel C: Use actual diﬀerence instead of dummy
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.61) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.14) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN 0.614 1.365 1.514 2.014 1.368 2.010
(0.64) (1.11) (1.57) (1.62) (1.41) (1.61)
ABSDIFF -27.955 -31.693 -19.856 -25.756 -22.075 -27.819
(-3.87) (-3.41) (-2.71) (-2.73) (-3.00) (-2.94)
Panel D: Use contracts expiring in three months, 16 surprises
Intercept -0.523 -0.579 -0.541 -0.556 -0.532 -0.584
(-2.60) (-2.23) (-2.65) (-2.11) (-2.59) (-2.21)
ANN 0.698 1.556 1.555 1.978 1.420 2.037
(0.71) (1.23) (1.56) (1.54) (1.42) (1.59)
SUR 7.288 6.923 5.104 6.906 5.650 7.009
(2.71) (2.00) (1.88) (1.97) (2.06) (2.00)
ANN+SUR 7.986 8.479 6.659 8.884 7.07 9.046
p-value 0.0015 0.0089 0.009 0.0069 0.0059 0.006
Panel E: Use announcement returns
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.530 -0.541 -0.513 -0.562
(-2.61) (-2.25) (-2.62) (-2.08) (-2.50) (-2.14)
ANN 11.940 13.026 6.789 6.510 7.210 6.949
(4.19) (3.55) (2.36) (1.76) (2.48) (1.86)
ANNRET 1.637 2.525 2.369 2.953 2.152 2.875
(1.79) (2.15) (2.57) (2.49) (2.31) (2.41)
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Table 9 (continued):
Event time Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel F: Use Kuttner (2001) unexpected rate change, 4 surprises
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.541 -0.530 -0.562 -0.513
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.07) (-2.61) (-2.14) (-2.50)
ANN 1.713 2.703 3.070 2.464 3.019 2.243
(1.84) (2.26) (2.55) (2.63) (2.49) (2.37)
SUR 3.643 3.779 1.035 2.737 2.015 3.023
(0.71) (0.58) (0.16) (0.53) (0.30) (0.58)
ANN+SUR 5.356 6.482 4.105 5.201 5.034 5.266
p-value 0.2868 0.3158 0.3033 0.5279 0.3026 0.4424
Panel G: Use Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) surprises
Intercept -0.397 -0.928 -0.486 -0.946 -0.456 -0.954
(-1.34) (-2.44) (-1.61) (-2.41) (-1.50) (-2.44)
ANN 1.340 2.190 2.864 3.844 2.720 3.778
(0.96) (1.22) (2.02) (2.08) (1.91) (2.06)
Target 0.063 -0.130 0.366 0.085 0.325 0.065
(0.28) (-0.46) (1.61) (0.29) (1.42) (0.22)
Path -0.206 -0.268 -0.062 -0.163 -0.078 -0.169
(-2.09) (-2.12) (-0.62) (-1.25) (-0.77) (-1.30)
Panel H: Use current month contract only, 14 surprises
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.13) (-2.60) (-2.23)
ANN 1.590 2.444 2.337 2.769 2.265 2.844
(1.64) (1.96) (2.38) (2.19) (2.29) (2.24)
SUR 1.050 -2.021 -0.168 -1.879 -0.103 -1.943
(0.37) (-0.55) (-0.06) (-0.51) (-0.04) (-0.52)
ANN+SUR 2.64 0.423 2.169 0.89 2.162 0.901
p-value 0.3269 0.9027 0.4261 0.8001 0.4309 0.7979
Panel I: Use non-current month contracts, 13 surprises
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.14) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN 0.586 1.143 1.644 2.087 1.398 1.985
(0.54) (0.82) (1.49) (1.47) (1.26) (1.40)
SUR 5.204 6.533 2.639 4.389 3.280 4.979
(2.67) (2.61) (1.34) (1.73) (1.65) (1.96)
ANN+SUR 5.79 7.676 4.283 6.476 4.678 6.964
p-value 0.0004 0.0003 0.01 0.0025 0.0052 0.0012
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Table 10: Alternative surprise deﬁnitions for the QE period
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market with
alternative surprise deﬁnitions for FOMC announcements during the Quantitative Easing
(QE) period. The dependent variables are the order imbalances calculated using both
number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID) during the lockup period starting at
thirty minutes before the scheduled announcement time. The news announcement time
is set to the scheduled release time in Columns 1 and 2, the actual time in Columns 3
and 4, and the earlier of the two in Columns 5 and 6. In Panel A, we use the mean of the
target range and the 12.5 bp threshold to deﬁne surprise in the QE period. For the rest
of the sample period, we use the same deﬁnition as in Table 5. In Panel B, we use the
realized rate changes in the 10-year treasury to deﬁne surprise. SUR is euqal to one if the
magnitude of the realized rate change on the announcement day exceeds 1.75 times the
its standard deviation calculated using data from 10 days before and 10 days after each
announcement. For observations in the surprise announcement group, the signs of the
order imbalance variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise.
Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last row of each panel reports
the p-value of the Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients of ANN and SUR equals to
zero.
Event time Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Panel A: Using the mean of target range as the target rate, 38 observations
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.14) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN -0.313 0.132 1.250 1.202 0.971 1.099
(-0.29) (0.09) (1.13) (0.85) (0.87) (0.77)
SUR 6.459 7.928 3.281 5.814 3.992 6.394
(3.32) (3.17) (1.66) (2.29) (2.01) (2.51)
ANN+SUR 6.146 8.06 4.531 7.016 4.963 7.493
p-value 0.0002 0.0001 0.0064 0.0011 0.003 0.0005
Panel B: Using realized rate change, 31 observations
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.60) (-2.25) (-2.66) (-2.14) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN 0.089 0.780 1.410 1.547 1.164 1.484
(0.09) (0.58) (1.33) (1.13) (1.09) (1.08)
SUR 6.284 7.086 3.374 5.724 4.107 6.273
(3.03) (2.66) (1.61) (2.11) (1.94) (2.31)
ANN+SUR 6.373 7.866 4.784 7.271 5.271 7.757
p-value 0.0004 0.0007 0.0092 0.0021 0.0044 0.0011
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Table 11: Market activities before positive and negative surprises
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market for FOMC
announcements with positive and negative surprises. The dependent variables are the order
imbalances calculated using both number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID) during the
lockup period starting at thirty minutes before the scheduled announcement time. The news
announcement time is set to the scheduled release time in Columns 1 and 2, the actual time
in Columns 3 and 4, and the earlier of the two in Columns 5 and 6. Variables ANN is deﬁned
in Table 4. We divide the surprise announcements into positive and negative surprises. Bad
equals one when the announced Federal funds target rate is above the futures-implied rate by
at least 12.5 bp and zero otherwise. Good equals one when the announced Federal funds target
rate is below the futures-implied rate by at least 12.5 bp and zero otherwise. Corresponding
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Event time Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Intercept -0.524 -0.584 -0.543 -0.562 -0.535 -0.589
(-2.61) (-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.14) (-2.60) (-2.24)
ANN 0.012 0.486 1.255 1.219 1.024 1.148
(0.01) (0.37) (1.22) (0.92) (0.99) (0.86)
Bad 1.020 -1.785 0.011 -3.259 0.240 -3.198
(0.24) (-0.33) (0.00) (-0.59) (0.06) (-0.58)
Good 10.764 12.887 6.982 10.903 8.019 11.803
(4.30) (4.00) (2.75) (3.33) (3.14) (3.60)
ANN + Bad 1.032 -1.299 1.266 -2.04 1.264 -2.05
p-value 0.8011 0.8051 0.6806 0.7454 0.7657 0.6974
ANN + Good 10.776 13.373 8.237 12.122 9.043 12.951
p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 12: Price behavior around the FOMC announcements
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market
for FOMC announcements. The dependent variables are the returns in diﬀerent event
windows relative to the oﬃcially scheduled announcement time 0. The news announce-
ment time t is set to the scheduled release time in Panel A, the actual time in Panel B,
and the earlier of the two in Panel C. Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4.
For observations in the surprise announcement group, the signs of the order imbalance
variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise. Corresponding
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last row of each panel reports the p-value of
the Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients of ANN and SUR equals to zero.
Event time [-60,-30] [-30,t] [t,60] [-30,-20] [-20,-10] [-10,t]
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: time t is the scheduled time
Intercept 0.603 -0.970 1.519 -0.468 -0.232 -0.267
(1.22) (-1.97) (1.67) (-1.60) (-0.78) (-0.87)
ANN 1.367 -4.146 7.166 0.159 0.417 -4.715
(0.55) (-1.67) (1.56) (0.11) (0.28) (-3.05)
SUR -1.646 22.154 -6.079 -0.046 2.397 19.800
(-0.30) (4.05) (-0.60) (-0.01) (0.72) (5.82)
ANN+SUR -0.279 18.008 1.087 0.113 2.814 15.085
p-value 0.9549 0.0003 0.9049 0.9692 0.3481 <.0001
Panel B: time t is the actual time
Intercept 0.603 -0.866 1.196 -0.468 -0.232 -0.164
(1.22) (-1.78) (0.56) (-1.60) (-0.78) (-0.57)
ANN 1.367 2.915 0.355 0.159 0.417 2.348
(0.55) (1.19) (0.03) (0.11) (0.28) (1.61)
SUR -1.646 4.060 12.164 -0.046 2.397 1.693
(-0.30) (0.75) (0.51) (-0.01) (0.72) (0.53)
ANN+SUR -0.279 6.975 12.519 0.113 2.814 4.041
p-value 0.9549 0.1512 0.5614 0.9692 0.3481 0.1617
Panel C: time t is MIN{schedule time, actual time}
Intercept 0.603 -0.904 1.196 -0.468 -0.232 -0.201
(1.22) (-1.88) (0.56) (-1.60) (-0.78) (-0.72)
ANN 1.367 2.494 0.806 0.159 0.417 1.926
(0.55) (1.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.28) (1.36)
SUR -1.646 5.542 10.695 -0.046 2.397 3.176
(-0.30) (1.04) (0.45) (-0.01) (0.72) (1.02)
ANN+SUR -0.279 8.036 11.501 0.113 2.814 5.102
p-value 0.9549 0.1466 0.5596 0.9692 0.3481 0.1561
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Table 13: Price discovery from informed order ﬂow
This table presents OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market for
126 FOMC announcements. The dependent variables are the order imbalances calculated
using number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID). The news announcement time
t is set to the actual time. Retlockup is the return during the lockup period starting
thirty minutes before the scheduled release time and ending at actual announcement
time. Ret0,n denotes the post-announcement return from the actual release time to n
minutes later. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Variable OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Intercept 0.022 0.052 0.020 0.050 0.019 0.052 0.020 0.050
(0.85) (1.74) (0.79) (1.75) (0.79) (1.79) (0.80) (1.75)
Retlockup 62.888 53.474 61.927 50.243 60.612 50.493 62.404 48.939
(2.90) (2.09) (2.83) (1.99) (2.78) (1.97) (2.83) (1.93)
Ret0,1 1.424 -0.814
(0.28) (-0.14)
Ret0,5 -1.011 -4.813
(-0.23) (-0.97)
Ret0,10 -1.906 -2.945
(-0.56) (-0.73)
Ret0,30 -0.201 -4.076
(-0.06) (-1.05)
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Table 14: Activities around FOMC announcements in other markets
In this table, we repeat our analysis for FOMC announcements with alternative testing
securities. Panels A to F report the results on the E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures, SPDR S&P 500
ETF, PowerShares QQQ ETF (tracking Nasdaq 100), 2-Year US Treasury Note futures, 10-
Year US Treasury Note futures, and Gold futures, respectively. The dependent variables are the
returns and order imbalances calculated using both number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume
(OID) during the lockup period starting at thirty minutes before the scheduled announcement
time. The news announcement time is set to the scheduled release time in Columns 1 and 2,
the actual time in Columns 3 and 4, and the earlier of the two in Columns 5 and 6. Variables
ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4. For observations in the surprise announcement group,
the signs of the return and order imbalance variables are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a
market-positive surprise. Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4. Corresponding t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The last row of each panel reports the p-value of the
Wald test that the sum of the coeﬃcients of ANN and SUR equals to zero.
Period Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent OIN OID Ret OIN OID Ret OIN OID Ret
Panel A: E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures
Intercept -0.172 -0.297 -1.918 0.181 0.124 2.220 0.181 0.124 2.220
(-0.89) (-1.13) (-2.39) (1.93) (0.86) (0.74) (1.92) (0.86) (0.74)
ANN 1.080 0.154 -6.075 1.642 0.842 0.813 1.560 0.521 -0.844
(1.10) (0.11) (-1.49) (3.40) (1.14) (0.05) (3.22) (0.70) (-0.05)
SUR 2.886 7.904 28.868 0.023 4.018 8.636 0.380 4.858 10.217
(1.39) (2.78) (3.34) (0.02) (2.57) (0.27) (0.37) (3.10) (0.31)
ANN+SUR 3.966 8.058 22.793 1.665 4.86 9.449 1.94 5.379 9.373
p-value 0.0326 0.0015 0.0031 0.0499 0.0002 0.6396 0.0066 <.0001 0.6907
Panel B: SPDR S&P 500 ETF
Intercept 1.029 -0.147 -0.958 1.166 -0.578 0.958 1.166 -0.578 0.958
(3.58) (-0.28) (-1.78) (6.38) (-1.71) (0.64) (6.36) (-1.71) (0.64)
ANN 1.513 4.938 -2.951 2.052 5.527 1.182 2.025 5.590 0.226
(1.03) (1.82) (-1.07) (2.20) (3.21) (0.15) (2.17) (3.25) (0.03)
SUR 8.373 -0.807 24.482 5.409 -4.500 3.685 5.590 -4.286 5.405
(2.63) (-0.14) (4.10) (2.67) (-1.20) (0.22) (2.75) (-1.14) (0.32)
ANN+SUR 9.886 4.131 21.531 7.461 1.027 4.867 7.615 1.304 5.631
p-value 0.0005 0.4350 <.0001 <.0001 0.8683 0.7522 <.0001 0.6871 0.6244
Panel C: PowerShares QQQ ETF (tracking Nasdaq 100)
Intercept 0.031 0.117 -1.716 0.339 -0.420 0.368 0.339 -0.420 0.368
(0.10) (0.25) (-2.10) (1.74) (-1.45) (0.16) (1.74) (-1.45) (0.16)
ANN -0.258 -2.939 -6.462 1.851 0.001 3.014 1.796 -0.229 1.505
(-0.16) (-1.23) (-1.54) (1.85) (0.00) (0.26) (1.79) (-0.15) (0.13)
SUR 7.769 9.720 30.841 3.231 4.547 11.246 3.280 4.343 11.632
(2.21) (1.93) (3.48) (1.53) (1.45) (0.46) (1.55) (1.38) (0.48)
ANN+SUR 7.511 6.781 24.379 5.082 4.548 14.26 5.076 4.114 13.137
p-value 0.0163 0.1312 0.002 0.0006 0.0921 0.4711 0.0014 0.0804 0.4799
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Table 14 (continued):
Period Scheduled Actual MIN{Scheduled, Actual}
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent OIN OID Ret OIN OID Ret OIN OID Ret
Panel D: 2-Year Treasury futures
Intercept 1.614 1.212 0.191 0.642 0.951 -0.631 0.642 0.951 -0.631
(1.26) (0.86) (1.11) (1.04) (1.34) (-1.52) (1.04) (1.34) (-1.52)
ANN -9.484 -8.089 -0.210 -6.149 -5.139 0.627 -6.478 -5.135 0.679
(-1.46) (-1.13) (-0.24) (-1.95) (-1.41) (0.30) (-2.05) (-1.41) (0.32)
SUR 15.725 20.701 0.513 17.025 19.738 0.095 17.199 19.795 0.067
(1.14) (1.36) (0.28) (2.54) (2.56) (0.02) (2.56) (2.57) (0.01)
ANN+SUR 6.241 12.612 0.303 10.876 14.599 0.722 10.721 14.66 0.746
p-value 0.6121 0.3518 0.8542 0.0699 0.034 0.8595 0.0734 0.0333 0.8526
Panel E: 10-Year Treasury futures
Intercept 0.298 0.136 0.018 0.426 0.063 -1.217 0.426 0.063 -1.217
(0.56) (0.23) (0.05) (1.80) (0.23) (-1.25) (1.79) (0.23) (-1.25)
ANN -1.719 -0.847 3.141 -1.134 0.045 3.954 -0.956 0.439 4.351
(-0.64) (-0.29) (1.78) (-0.93) (0.03) (0.79) (-0.78) (0.31) (0.87)
SUR 5.498 3.799 0.736 2.896 1.334 1.217 3.055 1.128 0.861
(0.96) (0.61) (0.20) (1.12) (0.44) (0.11) (1.18) (0.37) (0.08)
ANN+SUR 3.779 2.952 3.877 1.762 1.379 5.171 2.099 1.567 5.212
p-value 0.4599 0.5965 0.247 0.4654 0.6085 0.5796 0.3637 0.5602 0.5823
Panel F: Gold futures
Intercept -0.308 -0.617 -0.255 -0.954 -1.085 1.568 -0.954 -1.085 1.568
(-0.69) (-1.12) (-0.43) (-1.08) (-1.05) (1.03) (-1.08) (-1.05) (1.03)
ANN -0.634 -1.354 -1.572 0.060 -0.920 -2.604 -0.019 -0.859 -2.956
(-0.30) (-0.52) (-0.56) (0.01) (-0.13) (-0.26) (-0.00) (-0.13) (-0.29)
SUR -8.295 -11.612 0.668 -5.234 -11.397 1.713 -5.155 -11.457 2.065
(-1.13) (-1.27) (0.07) (-0.25) (-0.47) (0.05) (-0.25) (-0.47) (0.06)
ANN+SUR -8.929 -12.966 -0.904 -5.174 -12.317 -0.891 -5.174 -12.316 -0.891
p-value 0.208 0.1392 0.9241 0.8327 0.5984 0.9887 0.7953 0.5956 0.9793
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Table 15: Informed traders’ proﬁts around FOMC surprises
This table estimates the proﬁts of early informed traders in the 25 surprise FOMC announce-
ments. We assume the informed traders acquire the news at thirty minutes before the scheduled
announcement time, accumulate positions until the actual announcement time, and liquidate
their position at the end of ﬁve minutes, ten minutes, or thirty minutes after the actual an-
nouncement. The lower bounds of the proﬁts are calculated assuming that the informed traders
use market orders and the resulting imbalance in each second during the lockup is due only to
informed trades. The upper bounds are calculated assuming that the informed traders success-
fully enter the right position behind every transaction using either a market order or a limit
order. The trading proﬁts are aggregated across all transactions on the same announcement
date and summary statistics are reported for the days. The number in the informed trading
proﬁt variables indicate the assumed position closing time after the actual announcement and
the ’lower’ and ’upper’ indicate the side of the boundary.
Statistic Proﬁt5 lower Proﬁt5 upper Proﬁt10 lower Proﬁt10 upper Proﬁt30 lower Proﬁt30 upper
Panel A: E-mini S&P 500 futures only
Mean 139,398 6,112,174 102,725 8,298,398 347,761 5,565,444
Std. dev. 1,844,628 19,173,420 2,316,577 24,673,519 2,698,181 27,264,839
Sum 3,484,953 152,804,346 2,568,122 207,459,944 8,694,020 139,136,109
Panel B: All markets
Mean 180,179 6,962,984 261,456 8,420,849 256,015 6,280,122
Std. dev. 1,680,259 21,912,198 2,623,964 24,826,879 3,118,885 27,827,551
Sum 4,504,469 174,074,608 6,536,411 210,521,235 6,400,375 157,003,043
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Table A1: FOMC announcement observations
The table lists the FOMC announcement sample observations in the study. Associated with
each announcement, the oﬃcial time is the scheduled news release time according to the FOMC
meeting minutes. The actual time is the earliest release time found on public news agencies.
Bottom denotes the lower bound of the Federal funds target rate and Up denotes the upper
bound. Exp Rate is the implied Federal funds rate on the day before FOMC announcement
from all of the Federal funds rate futures and Exp Rate 3-month uses only contracts expiring
in three months to calculate the implied rate.
Date Oﬃcial time Actual time Bottom Up Exp Rate Exp Rate 3-month
19970930 14:15:00 14:13:00 5.5 5.5 5.918 5.923
19971112 14:15:00 14:12:00 5.5 5.5 5.595 5.591
19971216 14:15:00 14:15:00 5.5 5.5 5.614 5.612
19980204 14:15:00 14:12:00 5.5 5.5 5.442 5.446
19980331 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.5 5.5 5.57 5.574
19980519 14:15:00 14:13:00 5.5 5.5 5.566 5.548
19980701 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.5 5.5 5.528 5.52
19980818 14:15:00 14:12:00 5.5 5.5 5.484 5.49
19980929 14:15:00 14:12:00 5.25 5.25 5.173 5.179
19981117 14:15:00 14:19:00 4.75 4.75 4.857 4.866
19981222 14:15:00 14:13:00 4.75 4.75 4.727 4.776
19990203 14:15:00 14:12:00 4.75 4.75 4.741 4.741
19990330 14:15:00 14:12:00 4.75 4.75 4.803 4.788
19990518 14:15:00 14:11:00 4.75 4.75 4.833 4.82
19990630 14:15:00 14:15:00 5 5 5.167 5.134
19990824 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.238
19991005 14:15:00 14:12:00 5.25 5.25 5.322 5.322
19991116 14:15:00 14:16:00 5.5 5.5 5.413 5.404
19991221 14:15:00 14:13:00 5.5 5.5 5.661 5.627
20000202 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.75 5.75 5.927 5.895
20000321 14:15:00 14:14:00 6 6 6.065 6.032
20000516 14:15:00 14:13:00 6.5 6.5 6.528 6.5
20000628 14:15:00 14:15:00 6.5 6.5 6.572 6.571
20000822 14:15:00 14:14:00 6.5 6.5 6.541 6.533
20001003 14:15:00 14:12:00 6.5 6.5 6.488 6.488
20001115 14:15:00 14:12:00 6.5 6.5 6.516 6.516
20001219 14:15:00 14:16:00 6.5 6.5 6.288 6.356
20010131 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.5 5.5 5.294 5.332
20010320 14:15:00 14:13:00 5 5 4.886 4.924
20010515 14:15:00 14:15:00 4 4 4.066 4.07
20010627 14:15:00 14:12:00 3.75 3.75 3.641 3.703
20010821 14:15:00 14:13:00 3.5 3.5 3.415 3.465
20011002 14:15:00 14:15:00 2.5 2.5 2.315 2.315
20011106 14:15:00 14:19:00 2 2 2.005 2.008
20011211 14:15:00 14:14:00 1.75 1.75 1.753 1.733
Table A1 (continued):
Date Oﬃcial time Actual time Bottom Up Exp rate Exp rate 3-month
20020130 14:15:00 14:16:00 1.75 1.75 1.772 1.724
20020319 14:15:00 14:19:00 1.75 1.75 1.982 1.842
20020507 14:15:00 14:14:00 1.75 1.75 1.811 1.758
20020626 14:15:00 14:13:00 1.75 1.75 1.787 1.85
20020813 14:15:00 14:14:00 1.75 1.75 1.625 1.625
20020924 14:15:00 14:12:00 1.75 1.75 1.665 1.665
20021106 14:15:00 14:14:00 1.25 1.25 1.458 1.474
20021210 14:15:00 14:13:00 1.25 1.25 1.24 0
20030129 14:15:00 14:16:00 1.25 1.25 1.181 1.202
20030318 14:15:00 14:15:00 1.25 1.25 1.136 1.179
20030506 14:15:00 14:13:00 1.25 1.25 1.165 1.176
20030625 14:15:00 14:16:00 1 1 0.877 0.899
20030812 14:15:00 14:15:00 1 1 1.094 1.013
20030916 14:15:00 14:19:00 1 1 1.011 1.012
20031028 14:15:00 14:14:00 1 1 1.037 1.005
20031209 14:15:00 14:14:00 1 1 1.087 1.011
20040128 14:15:00 14:14:00 1 1 1.058 1.002
20040316 14:15:00 14:15:00 1 1 1.009 1.003
20040504 14:15:00 14:16:00 1 1 1.115 1.062
20040630 14:15:00 14:18:00 1.25 1.25 1.585 1.404
20040810 14:15:00 14:15:00 1.5 1.5 1.55 1.519
20040921 14:15:00 14:15:00 1.75 1.75 1.907 1.792
20041110 14:15:00 14:15:00 2 2 2.216 2.16
20041214 14:15:00 14:15:00 2.25 2.25 2.428 2.41
20050202 14:15:00 14:12:00 2.5 2.5 2.61 2.546
20050322 14:15:00 14:17:00 2.75 2.75 3.142 2.884
20050503 14:15:00 14:16:00 3 3 3.256 3.094
20050630 14:15:00 14:15:00 3.25 3.25 3.543 3.416
20050809 14:15:00 14:17:00 3.5 3.5 3.95 3.658
20050920 14:15:00 14:17:00 3.75 3.75 3.878 3.765
20051101 14:15:00 14:18:00 4 4 4.34 4.103
20051213 14:15:00 14:13:00 4.25 4.25 4.459 4.369
20060131 14:15:00 14:14:00 4.5 4.5 4.564 4.558
20060328 14:15:00 14:17:00 4.75 4.75 4.969 4.76
20060510 14:15:00 14:17:00 5 5 5.107 5.095
20060629 14:15:00 14:16:00 5.25 5.25 5.335 5.308
20060808 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.25 5.25 5.309 5.305
20060920 14:15:00 14:13:00 5.25 5.25 5.259 5.261
20061025 14:15:00 14:13:00 5.25 5.25 5.266 5.248
20061212 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.25 5.25 5.21 5.236
20070131 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.25 5.25 5.247 5.247
20070321 14:15:00 14:15:00 5.25 5.25 5.2 5.233
20070509 14:15:00 14:15:00 5.25 5.25 5.221 5.244
20070628 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.25 5.25 5.24 5.242
20070807 14:15:00 14:14:00 5.25 5.25 5.217 5.218
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Table A1 (continued):
Date Oﬃcial time Actual time Bottom Up Exp rate Exp rate 3-month
20070918 14:15:00 14:15:00 4.75 4.75 4.73 4.855
20071031 14:15:00 14:15:00 4.5 4.5 4.44 4.501
20071211 14:15:00 14:15:00 4.25 4.25 4.037 4.134
20080130 14:15:00 14:14:00 3 3 3.061 3.079
20080318 14:15:00 14:14:00 2.25 2.25 1.795 1.847
20080430 14:15:00 14:15:00 2 2 2.021 2.017
20080625 14:15:00 14:09:00 2 2 2.164 2.063
20080805 14:15:00 14:13:00 2 2 2.105 2.056
20080916 14:15:00 14:14:00 2 2 1.794 1.795
20081029 14:15:00 14:17:00 0.5 1 0.905 0.907
20081216 14:15:00 14:11:00 0 0.25 0.33 0.33
20090128 14:15:00 14:14:00 0 0.25 0.252 0.23
20090318 14:15:00 14:17:00 0 0.25 0.225 0.225
20090624 14:15:00 14:18:00 0 0.25 0.359 0.229
20090812 14:15:00 14:16:00 0 0.25 0.355 0.198
20090923 14:15:00 14:16:00 0 0.25 0.28 0.185
20091104 14:15:00 14:18:00 0 0.25 0.319 0.154
20091216 14:15:00 14:15:00 0 0.25 0.282 0.171
20100127 14:15:00 14:16:00 0 0.25 0.234 0.138
20100316 14:15:00 14:14:00 0 0.25 0.268 0.195
20100428 14:15:00 14:14:00 0 0.25 0.357 0.217
20100623 14:15:00 14:15:00 0 0.25 0.292 0.204
20100810 14:15:00 14:14:00 0 0.25 0.218 0.177
20100921 14:15:00 14:14:00 0 0.25 0.193 0.185
20101103 14:15:00 14:16:00 0 0.25 0.189 0.175
20101214 14:15:00 14:15:00 0 0.25 0.255 0.182
20110126 14:15:00 14:16:00 0 0.25 0.24 0.172
20110315 14:15:00 14:13:00 0 0.25 0.245 0.139
20110427 12:30:00 12:32:00 0 0.25 0.271 0.115
20110622 12:30:00 12:27:00 0 0.25 0.208 0.109
20110809 14:15:00 14:18:00 0 0.25 0.101 0.085
20110921 14:15:00 14:24:00 0 0.25 0.071 0.069
20111102 12:30:00 12:32:00 0 0.25 0.114 0.085
20111213 14:15:00 14:13:00 0 0.25 0.11 0.092
20120125 12:30:00 12:28:00 0 0.25 0.112 0.085
20120313 14:15:00 14:15:00 0 0.25 0.143 0.116
20120425 12:30:00 12:32:00 0 0.25 0.15 0.135
20120620 12:30:00 12:32:00 0 0.25 0.168 0.167
20120801 14:15:00 14:13:00 0 0.25 0.136 0.14
20120913 12:30:00 12:31:00 0 0.25 0.126 0.128
20121024 14:15:00 14:15:00 0 0.25 0.146 0.149
20121212 12:30:00 12:30:00 0 0.25 0.138 0.142
20130130 14:15:00 14:15:00 0 0.25 0.137 0.133
20130320 14:00:00 14:00:00 0 0.25 0.14 0.143
20130501 14:00:00 14:01:00 0 0.25 0.125 0.125
20130619 14:00:00 14:00:00 0 0.25 0.105 0.103
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Table A2: Market reaction to FOMC surprises
The table shows the stock market reaction to the FOMC announcement surprise in the sample
of 126 scheduled announcements between September 30, 1997 and June 19, 2013. Reported
are the OLS regression results of the announcement returns on the expected and unexpected
changes in the target Federal funds rate. The announcement returns are calculated in three
event windows relative to the scheduled announcement time deﬁned as time 0 on the E-mini
S&P 500 futures in Panel A, the E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures in Panel B, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF
in Panel C, and the PowerShares QQQ ETF (tracking Nasdaq 100) in Panel D. Expected is the
volume-weighted Federal funds future implied rate on the day before FOMC announcements
using all contracts. Unexpected is the actual Federal funds rate minus the expected rate.
The calculation method is detailed in Subsection 3.2. Associated t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
Variable Ret[-5,5] Ret[-15,15] Ret[-30,30]
Panel A: E-mini S&P 500 futures
Intercept -7.918 -13.324 -11.461
(-2.11) (-2.79) (-1.77)
Expected -39.792 -23.286 -29.095
(-3.01) (-1.38) (-1.28)
Unexpected -147.485 -158.107 -160.762
(-4.30) (-3.62) (-2.72)
Panel B: E-mini Nasdaq 100 futures
Intercept -7.918 -13.324 -11.461
(-2.11) (-2.79) (-1.77)
Expected -39.792 -23.286 -29.095
(-3.01) (-1.38) (-1.28)
Unexpected -147.485 -158.107 -160.762
(-4.30) (-3.62) (-2.72)
Panel C: SPDR S&P 500 ETF
Intercept -7.918 -13.324 -11.461
(-2.11) (-2.79) (-1.77)
Expected -39.792 -23.286 -29.095
(-3.01) (-1.38) (-1.28)
Unexpected -147.485 -158.107 -160.762
(-4.30) (-3.62) (-2.72)
Panel D: PowerShares QQQ ETF (tracking Nasdaq 100 index)
Intercept -7.918 -13.324 -11.461
(-2.11) (-2.79) (-1.77)
Expected -39.792 -23.286 -29.095
(-3.01) (-1.38) (-1.28)
Unexpected -147.485 -158.107 -160.762
(-4.30) (-3.62) (-2.72)
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Table A3: Market dynamics around macroeconomic announcements
This table presents pooled OLS regression results in the E-mini S&P 500 futures market
using observations in three event windows for each announcement: [-60,-30], [-30,0], and [0,60].
The dependent variables are the order imbalances calculated using both number of trades
(OIN) and dollar volume (OID). Variables ANN and SUR are deﬁned in Table 4. Lockup is a
dummy equal to one for observations in the lockup window ([-30,0]), and zero otherwise. Post
is a dummy equal to one for observations in the post-lockup period ([0,60]), and zero otherwise.
For observations in the surprise announcement group, the signs of the order imbalance variables
are adjusted to reﬂect the eﬀects of a market-positive surprise. Corresponding t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
FOMC Nonfarm payroll CPI GDP
Variable OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
Intercept 0.118 -0.325 0.529 0.623 0.621 0.737 0.592 0.740
(0.61) (-1.31) (1.83) (1.71) (2.14) (2.02) (2.03) (2.01)
ANN -0.629 1.197 -0.420 0.443 -1.030 0.260 0.153 2.111
(-0.64) (0.96) (-0.28) (0.24) (-0.70) (0.14) (0.11) (1.16)
SUR -0.279 -5.366 -4.448 -3.916 -1.411 -4.550 0.511 -1.786
(-0.13) (-1.94) (-1.71) (-1.20) (-0.54) (-1.37) (0.19) (-0.52)
Lockup -0.654 -0.277 -0.424 -0.149 -0.529 -0.279 -0.537 -0.355
(-2.37) (-0.79) (-1.03) (-0.29) (-1.29) (-0.54) (-1.30) (-0.68)
ANN*Lockup 0.659 -0.706 2.790 3.725 3.059 2.454 1.331 0.930
(0.48) (-0.40) (1.33) (1.41) (1.47) (0.94) (0.65) (0.36)
SUR*Lockup 8.698 14.745 0.936 -1.344 -0.664 2.589 -0.986 0.120
(2.83) (3.77) (0.25) (-0.29) (-0.18) (0.55) (-0.26) (0.02)
Post -0.228 0.228 -1.850 -2.121 -1.958 -2.207 -1.931 -2.230
(-0.82) (0.65) (-4.51) (-4.11) (-4.77) (-4.27) (-4.69) (-4.29)
ANN*Post 0.161 -1.085 1.893 2.202 1.974 1.219 1.429 -0.454
(0.12) (-0.62) (0.90) (0.84) (0.95) (0.46) (0.70) (-0.18)
SUR*Post 0.544 5.416 4.339 4.940 3.116 6.962 2.575 7.646
(0.18) (1.39) (1.18) (1.07) (0.84) (1.49) (0.67) (1.58)
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Table A4: Order imbalance before surprise events using the Kuttner (2001) method
This table reports the order imbalance in number of trades (OIN) and dollar volume (OID)
during the lockup periods preceding four surprise announcements based on the Kuttner (2001)
method. The order imbalance is expressed in percentage.
Scheduled Actual Min{Scheduled, Actual}
Date Surprise (bp) OIN OID OIN OID OIN OID
11/6/2002 -19 6.562 7.273 6.562 7.273 6.562 7.273
6/25/2003 15 -2.405 -16.572 -2.076 -12.939 -2.405 -16.572
9/18/2007 -15 0.583 -2.517 0.583 -2.517 0.583 -2.517
3/18/2008 17 -9.775 -2.266 -9.463 -3.441 -9.463 -3.441
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